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OUTSOURCING HUMAN
REPRODUCTION: EMBRYOS &
SURROGACY SERVICES IN THE
CYBERPROCREATION ERA
J. BRAD REICH* & DAWN SWINK
"Cyberprocreation": using the Internei to create human life
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a child was conceived via male-female intercourse, but
the Internet provides many more possibilities. In 2011 Patrick, a single,
sterile man wants a baby, but does not want to adopt.1 He goes online and
performs a Google search for eggs 2 and sperm3 to discover millions of
ready suppliers.4 Patrick purchases these materials through PayPal. 5 He
Copyright 0 J. Brad Reich & Dawn Swink 2011.
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** J.D. Drake University Law School, Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas. This article
is dedicated to my sister, Peg Grundmeier.
1. Patrick is a fictional character used for illustrative purposes.
2. A January 4, 2011, Google search using "egg donor wanted" returned 85,301 hits in .14
seconds. See, e.g., THE DONOR SOURCE, http://www.thedonorsource.com (last visited Apr. 5,
2011); TINY TREASURES AGENCY, http://www.tinytreasuresagency.com (last visited Apr. 5,
2011); EGG DONATION, http://www.eggdonation.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); CORI'S EGG
DONOR SERVICES, http://www.coriseggdonorservices.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
3. A January 4, 2011, Google search using "sperm donor wanted" returned 127,101 hits in
.18 seconds. See, e.g., PRIVATE SPERM, http://www.privatesperm.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011);
SPERM DONORS WORLDWIDE, http://www.sperm-donors-worldwide.com (last visited Apr. 5,
2011); FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); XYTEX,
http://www.xytex.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
4. Although Patrick is intrigued by entities offering "designer" embryos, it is unclear if there
is an online "designer" bank operational at this time, although there has been at least one available
online recently. See infra notes 21-22; see also Debra Saunders, Embryos Made to Order, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 8, 2006, at B7. It appears the founder has since closed this "bank" due to public
pressure and commentary. Press Release, , Abraham Center of Life LLC, Abraham Center of Life
No Longer in Embryo Business (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.eworldwire.com/pressreleases/1 7092.
241
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:241
wants his child as soon as possible, 6 so he has the tissues shipped to a South
African fertility clinic7 where the egg is fertilized and implanted into an
Indian surrogate, also discovered online.8 Patrick regularly monitors
ultrasound using Sight Speed video link9 and receives weekly email
medical updates with portable document format attachments (pdfs).1 0 He
connects his laptop computer to his television and watches the birth in his
living room via Skype.' I He then retains a "guide" to accompany the
newborn to his local airport where he meets his new baby for the first time.
He pays all costs through secure websites. Patrick created human life
through cyberspace. There is nothing "traditional" about potential baby
making in the Cyberprocreation era.
While this scenario may seem implausible to some, that is only
because it is so different from how many envision human procreation.
Every technological aspect identified is readily available and potential
human life is truly just a few cyber links away. That reality raises many
issues begging discussion and analysis. This article focuses on two: embryo
donation and surrogacy. We contend that while the Internet increased the
availability of, and the market for, human embryos and surrogacy services
5. PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (providing financial services
for online transactions).
6. Patrick could have opted to store the embryos at an embryo bank using a process known
as "cryopreservation." A January 4, 2011, Google search using "embryo bank storage" generated
343,000 hits in .28 seconds. See, e.g., THE SPERM AND EMBRYO BANK OF NEW JERSEY,
http://www.sperml.com/sebnj/index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); Sperm Bank, Inc.,
www.spermbankcalifornia.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); Centrum voor Reproductieve
Geneeskunde, www.brussellsivf.be/embryobank (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). "Cryopreservation"
means freezing the embryo for future use. See David 1. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in
the United States and Their Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066
(2003).
7. A January 4, 2011, Google search using "fertility clinic services" generated 24,000,000
hits in .22 seconds. See, e.g., THE CENTER FOR ADVANCED REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES,
www.fertilitycenter-uconn.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); AMERICAN FERTILITY,
www.americanfertility.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); MIDLAND FERTILITY SERVICES,
www.midlandfertility.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
8. A January 2, 2011, Google search using "surrogacy services" generated 429,000 hits in
.26 seconds. See, e.g., SURROGATE PARENTING SERVICES, http://www.surrogateparenting.com
(last visited Apr. 5, 2011); THE FERTILITY INSTITUTES, http://www.fertility-docs.com (last visited
Apr. 5, 2011); SURROGACY ABROAD, http://www.surrogacyabroad.com (last visited Apr. 5,
2011).
9. See SIGHTSPEED, http://www.sightspeed.com, (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) (providing a
videoconferencing service).
10. See TRS. OF IND. UNIV. What is a PDF File, INDIANA UNIVERSITY (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.kb.iu.edu/data/aftt.html ("PDF (Portable Document Format) is a file format developed
by Adobe as a means of distributing compact, platform-independent documents.").
I1. SKYPE, http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/features/allfeatures/video-call/ (last visited Apr.
5, 2011) (providing a system whereby a computer can communicate with another computer or
phone).
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to a larger audience than ever envisioned, it also created significant and
unimagined legal concerns for embryo donors, 12 suppliers,13 surrogates' 4
and surrogate providers.' 5
Parts I and II of this article provide a background on various Assisted
Reproductive Technology ("ART") procedures and perspective on current
applications. We will see that a combination of need, technological
advancement, cost and process effectiveness, and increasing social
acceptance will fuel the future use of donor embryos and/or surrogates.16
Part III discusses the Internet's impact on ART. Without question, the
Internet increased the level of information available on virtually any
subject.' 7  This section addresses three significant Cyberprocreation
developments. First, the Internet likely creates or influences the idea that
people should be, or use, reproductive goods or service providers.' 8 Second,
it fosters new approaches and developments. 19 Third, it shapes where
people pursue ART, a development known as "Reproductive Tourism." 20
In Part IV we look at international, federal, state, and voluntary
association regulation of embryo and surrogacy practices. We will find that
despite the significant danger posed by defective embryos or inadequate
surrogates, along with the investments some consumers are willing to
incur, 21 these areas are the "wild west" 22 and largely unregulated.
Part V analyzes potential parental rights and responsibilities of embryo
donors and surrogates. While it will undoubtedly surprise some, it is
increasingly likely that surrogates may have parental rights and, to the
surprise of the surrogate, she may have parental responsibilities as well.
Parties may try to address these issues through surrogacy contracts, but we
12. See infra text accompanying note 28 (defining embryo donors).
13. See infra text accompanying note 30 (defining suppliers).
14. See infra text accompanying note 31 (defining surrogates).
15. See infra Part 1.
16. See infra Parts 1-11.
17. See, e.g., EHOW.COM, http://www.ehow.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (giving
information on such topics as how to milk a goat, how to pay for items online, or how to stay
awake while racing in the Iditarod); HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://www.HowStuffWorks.com (last
visited Mar. 16, 2011) (providing access to bizarre facts and explanations of how things work).
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. See infra Part Ill.
20. See infra Part Ill.
21. See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, Bringing Out Baby: Who Pays for IVF?, ABC NEWS,
Apr. 8, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/HealthlReproductiveHealthlbringing-baby-pays-
ivf/story?id=4607004 (reporting that one couple paid for one IVF child by securing a second
home mortgage and a second child using the couple's inheritance).
22. See Debra Spar, Taming the Wild West ofAssisted Reproduction, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR,
Feb. 26, 2009, available at http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2009/02/26/taming-wild-west-
assisted-reproduction.
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will see that there is no guarantee that such agreements will be legally
enforceable. 23
Finally, Part VI shifts the focus from parentage to product liability. We
analyze potential liability for embryo donors and suppliers under breach of
warranty, strict product liability, and negligence causes of action.24 We then
assess potential surrogate and surrogate provider liability under negligence
and breach of contract.25 The article concludes with predictions and
recommendations as society continues forward in the Cyberprocreation Era.
I. A NECESSARY CAVEAT
Readers will quickly realize that much is unsettled, and certainly
unknown, in the rapidly developing world of ART. This article represents
an important discussion, but clear language and consistent use is essential to
guide our collaborative journey. We, therefore, provide certain operational
definitions before we proceed further:
1. "Embryo" - the prefetal product of human conception from
implantation through the eighth week of development. 26
2. "Designer embryo" - an embryo created to attempt to include or
exclude certain resulting characteristics. 27
3. "Embryo donor" - the person(s) who causes the embryo to exist.28
4. "Embryo donation" - providing an embryo in exchange for
compensation.29
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Part VI.B.
26. THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/embryo (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011). This definition is appropriate for our discussion; however, the development
during this time actually encompasses multiple steps with increasing cell division. See Craig
Freudenrich, How Sex Works: The Fertilization Process, DISCOVERY HEALTH,
http://health.howstuffworks.com/sexual-health/sexuality/human-reproductionlO.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2011) (explaining the fertilization process).
Initially the sperm fertilizes one or more eggs, resulting in a zygote. Id. The zygote develops in a
blastocyst within a few days. Id. The blastocyst becomes an embryo once it has developed cells to
support both the fetus and the placenta. Id.
27. See, Kate Foster, Couples Offered Designer Babies (PGD Embryo Screening), FREE
REPUBLIC, Jan 17, 2009, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2166642/posts (defining
what a designer embryo is and the process of how one is created).
28. This could actually encompass a wide variety of situations: fertile couples, a couple or
individual using an egg or sperm donor, or a couple or individual using an egg and sperm donor.
29. While it may seem unusual to define a donor as a person receiving compensation, that is
the appropriate definition when discussing donation of human reproductive tissues eggs, sperm, or
embryos because such "donors" are really "sellers". See, e.g., Donor Compensation, THE EGG
DONOR PROGRAM, http://www.eggdonation.com/becoming-an-egg-donor/Donor-
compensation.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (discussing the promise to reward donors with gifts
and the highest level of compensation); Fees, SPERM DONORS INC.,
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5. "Embryo supplier" - the person or entity that provides an embryo to
prospective parent(s), but has no biological connection to the embryo. 30
6. "Surrogate" - a woman who is paid to act as a replacement for
another woman who will not, or cannot, carry a pregnancy through to
term.31
7. "Surrogate provider" - an entity providing a surrogate to
prospective parent(s).
http://www.spermdonorsinc.com/Fees.html (identifying compensation to sperm donors as ranging
from $1,000-2,000 depending on qualifications) (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
Embryo donation is different from embryo adoption. See Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption:
What are the Laws, 26 J. Juv. L. 73, 73 (2006) ("[E]mbryo adoption is the 'donation of frozen
embryo(s) from one party to a recipient who wishes to bear and raise a child.' Embryo adoption is
simply defined as the gifting of embryos."), Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The Government
Adopts a Cause, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 279-83 (2006) (discussing the different
ways embryo adoption and embryo donation are defined). But see Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs
a New Set ofRules: Using Adoption Doctrine to Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 677, 678 (2004) (stating that the terms embryo donation and embryo adoption are
synonymous). This contention is frequently well supported by entities that merge the concepts,
likely causing confusion. See, e.g., Embryo Adoption, FERTILITYCOMMUNITY.COM,
http://www.embryoadoptions.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) ("The legal process of the transfer
of the embryos from the donor to the adopter is governed by contract law rather than adoption
law. The embryos are "owned" by the donating family and "ownership" is given to the adopting
family before the embryos are thawed and transferred into the adopting mother's womb. Adoption
agencies wrap the protections of current adoption practices around the process of embryo
donation.").
30. Common examples are fertility clinics offering embryo donation. See, e.g., Egg Donation,
CONCEPTUAL OPTIONS, http://www.conceptualoptions.com/egg-donation (last visited Apr. 16,
2011)
31. See THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/surrogacy (last
visited Apr. 6, 2011) (defining surrogate motherhood). There are two types of surrogates,
"traditional" and "gestational." See Heather Weller, Traditional versus Gestational Surrogacy ,
CHILDBIRTH SOLUTIONS http://childbirthsolutions.com/articles/traditional-versus-gestational-
surrogacy/ (explaining the difference between traditional and gestational surrogacy). In a
traditional surrogacy the surrogate's egg(s) are fertilized by donor semen using artificial
insemination Id. In a traditional surrogacy the surrogate is both the biological mother (as the egg
donor) and the birth mother. See Traditional Surrogacy, INFORMATION ON SURROGACY,
http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/traditional-surrogacy.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2011)
(explaining that the surrogate is the biological mother). In a gestational surrogacy the surrogate
carries an embryo using an egg donated by a third party. Weller, supra.. Here the surrogate is the
birth mother, but not the biological mother as she is not the egg donor. INFORMATION ON
SURROGACY, supra. The vast majority of current surrogacy relationships, perhaps as high as
ninety-five percent, are gestational. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the
Market for Babies, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 203, 224 (2009) (explaining that 95% of surrogacies
are gestational). One author argues, quite convincingly, that the perception of "baby selling" has
effectively destroyed the market for traditional surrogates. See Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law:
On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1918 (2009) ("The legal
classification of full surrogacy as baby-selling and maternal replacement has had crippling effects
on the formation of a market for full surrogacy."). Surrogacy may also be "commercial" or
"altruistic." See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 605, 608 (2003) (describing the different
motivations to become a surrogate).
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II. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPTION
Traditionally conception occurred through intercourse between a male
and female, with the male supplying the sperm and the female providing the
eggs. ART is the umbrella term for various medical technologies creating
conception through means other than coital reproduction. 32 There are a
number of ART strategies. 33 The oldest and most common is Artificial
Insemination (Al). 34 The next most common is In Vitro Fertilization
(IVF). 35 The goal of such procedures is to successfully fertilize a human
egg, resulting in an embryo. That embryo may then be stored for future use
or implanted into a woman's uterus for gestation. Gestation may involve the
services of a surrogate. There is very recent growth in ART practices using
embryo donation and/or surrogates36 and, going forward, these two trends
will be increasingly prominent for, at least, four reasons.
32. What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, U.S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last updated Feb. 14,
2011).
33. Examples of such techniques include intracytoplasmic sperm injections (ICSI) (injecting a
single sperm directing into an egg), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian
transfer (ZIFT), and Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), embryo transfer, and increasingly,
surrogacy. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 17 (2006).
34. See Kari Livingston, What is the Difference Between TS & GS Surrogacy, EHOW
available at http://www.ehow.com/info_8124952_difference-between-ts-gs-surrogacy.html. AI
is the least intrusive ART procedure. Al takes previously ejaculated sperm and implants it into a
woman's cervix or utrauterine lining. Weller, supra note 31. There are several forms of
insemination process such as standard vaginal and intrauterine. See Justyn Lezin,
(Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women's Access to Reproductive
Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 191 (2003)
(stating that vaginal insemination is the most commonly used method of insemination); KIM
TOEvs & STEPHANIE BRILL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY AND
BIRTH 304-5 (2002). There are two forms of Al but they differ based on who is providing the
sperm. See Definition ofAID, MEDTERMS,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey-6986 (last updated Oct. 21, 1998). In
Artificial Insemination by Husband, the husband is the donor. Id. In Artificial Insemination by
Donor, the donor is someone other than the recipient-mother's husband. Id
35. IVF (literally meaning "in glass") requires a sperm donor and a physician's/clinician's
assistance for implantation. The process begins with hormonal stimulation of a woman's ovaries
to produce multiple eggs. See IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, http://in-vitro-fertilization.eu/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2011) (explaining the process of in vitro fertilization). This woman may be the
intended birth mother or she may be an egg donor who will not carry any resulting child. The eggs
are surgically removed and placed in a glass Petri dish. Sperm are then introduced to the eggs. If
successful, the sperm fertilizes the eggs and upon an eight-cell stage, the "pre-embryo" is
transferred to a woman's uterus by cervical catheter. See Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio,
Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating "Non-
Traditional" Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 681 (2000)
(discussing gestational surrogacy and how after the ovum is fertilized with the sperm, it becomes
an embryo and is then placed into a woman's uterus).
36. See Ronni Berke, Single Men Turning to Surrogates, CNN, Dec. 23, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/I 2/23/single.men.parenting/?iref-mpstoryview ("[T]he
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First there is, and will be, increasing need. This need may be rooted in
biology, legal constraints, economics, culture, or a combination of these and
other factors. Biologically the fact is that many people have difficulty
conceiving,37 and that problem is getting worse.38 For some reproduction is
biologically impossible, even though there are no infertility issues.39 While
many people might need embryos or surrogacy services, the laws of their
domiciles may limit, or prohibit outright, such reproductive assistance,
forcing them to secure this aid elsewhere.4 0 Need is frequently financial.41
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, representing scores of reproductive clinics, reports
that the number of gestational surrogate births in the [United States] quadrupled between 1996 and
2006."). This rapid evolution cannot be over-stated. As recently as 2004 the President's Council
on Bioethics concluded that there was no embryo commerce taking place in the United States.
Jeffery T. Wise, Embryo Banking as a Novel Option for the Infertile? Law Policy, and a Proposed
Model Act, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 163, 177 (2007). Within 24 months "The World's
First Human Embryo Bank" was available online and based in San Antonio, Texas. This "Bank"
was properly known as the Abraham Centre of Life. See Rob Stein, Texas Firm First to Offer
Ready-Made Embryos, available at
http://www.chron.con/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/4451076.html. We can now obtain embryos
from diverse entities. See, e.g., CONCEPTUAL OPTIONS, supra note 30 (offering designer embryos
from many sources).; Embryo Donation, SPECIALISTS IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE & SURGERY,
P.A., http://www.dreamababy.com/embryo-donation.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011); Embryo
Donation, BETHANY CHRISTIAN SERVICES,
http://www.bethany.org/a55798fbethanywww.nsf/0/12a23ffbc63400a085257289006eb5d6 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
Of course, "growth" requires context. As one article properly notes, surrogacy is one of the least
used ART procedures. See Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business,
10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 46 (2009) (stating that surrogacy was used in one percent of ART
cycles in 2005. But, this fails to recognize the pronounced increase recently. See Berke, supra .
We also note that there are at least thirty clinics in the United States offering surrogacy services
with one boasting more than 1,400 births and another with fifty surrogates available. See Egg
Donor and Surrogacy Programs, INFERTILITY RESOURCES FOR CONSUMERS,,
http://www.ihr.com/infertility/provider/donoregg.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). Additionally
domestic physicians are increasingly using foreign surrogates. See infra text accompanying notes
100-107.
37. Spar & Harrington, supra note 36, at 44 (noting that an estimated 15% of American
women and 10- 15% of American men are infertile).
38. See CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH OF U.S. WOMEN: DATA FROM THE
2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 22 (2002), (reporting that an estimated 7.3 million
American women aged 15-44 reported some impaired ability to have children in 2002, compared
with 6.1 million in 1995, and 4.9 million in 1988).
39. See Berke, supra note 36 (discussing two agencies that have each experienced a fifty
percent increase in the number of single men using surrogacy services and noting that a significant
percentage of those using surrogates are gay men or couples or single, straight men.)
40. See infra text accompanying notes 91 93
41. Habiba Nosheen & Hilke Schellmann, The Most Wanted Surrogates in the World,
GLAMOUR MAGAZINE, Oct. 2010, available at http://www.glamour.com/magazine/2010/10/the-
most-wanted-surrogates-in-the-world) (discussing the trend by U.S. military wives to serve as
surrogates often to supplement family income).
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Those unable or unwilling42 to carry an embryo to term can hire a
surrogate. There are many women, both in the United States43 and abroad4,
who need the income surrogacy can provide. 45 There are many people who
42. See, e.g., Ruby L. Lee, Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial
Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275, 282 (2009) (discussing that
there is a"the trend of fertile, married, career women opting out of bearing their own children in
favor of convenience" and that there is an "increasing interest in using surrogates has come from
career women who do not want to take a break from their careers").
43. Nosheen & Schellmann, supra note 41. Surrogacy contracts in the United States appear to
range between $40,000 and $100,000. Nick Williams, India Adopts Surrogate Mother Hotspot,
VIDETTE REP., Nov. 1, 2010, available at
http://www.videtteonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view-article&id=33247:india-
adopts-surrogate-mother-hotspot&catid=37:newsnationalglobal&temid=53. While those
numbers may reflect the total contract "price," actual compensation to the surrogate might be far
less. See Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should
Surrogate Mothers be Compensated for their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC.
529, 531 (2007) ("Currently, the typical fee for a first time surrogate mother ranges from $14,000
to $18,000, with an average of $15,000." ); Surrogate, OPEN ARMS EGG DONATION AND
SURROGACY AGENCY, http://www.openarmsconsultants.com/index.php?action=sg (last visited
Mar. 18. 2011) (stating that this company provides a minimum compensation of $18,000 to a
surrogate).
At least one court refused to enforce a surrogacy contract, in part precisely because they were
concerned about the effect of compensation. See R.R. v. MH., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998)
("Eliminating any financial reward to a surrogate mother is the only way to assure that no
economic pressure will cause a woman, who may well be a member of an economically
vulnerable class, to act as a surrogate.").
See Lee, supra note 42, at 278 ("On average, an Indian gestational surrogate receives between
$2,800 and $5,600 for her services. For perspective, these amounts are equivalent to ten years'
salary for rural Indian women."); Krittivas Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Debate,
EZILON INFOBASE, Feb. 5, 2007 http://www.ezilon.com/information/article_17613.shtml (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011) ("[A] surrogate is paid anything between $3,000 and $6,000, a fortune in a
country with an annual per capita income of around $500.").
45. See, e.g., Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001 424052748704252004574459003279407832.html?KEYWO
RDS=Margot+Cohen (discussing one Indian woman's decision to be a surrogate because
"[H]aving someone else's child sounded like a better option than her other plan: selling a
kidney."). While there is some information regarding surrogates and financial need, there is little
publicly available regarding embryo donors, but we gain some insight from recent human egg
donation trends. Cf, Stephanie Smith, Dim Economy Drives Women to Donate Eggs for Profit,
CNN , Aug. 8, 2008, http://cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html (reporting a
Chicago clinic was fielding 30 to 50 inquiries a day from potential donors in 2008 compared to the
prior year's 10 to 30, while the Reproductive Science Center of the Bay Area received 158 calls in
July 2008, in contrast to 120 in July 2007). Fertility clinics report a dramatic increase in the
number of egg donations and procedures performed each year. Smith, supra. . This is particularly
true during the recent economic times. Cf Judy Keen, Recession Finds Fertile Field of Egg,
Sperm Donors, U.S.A. TODAY, July 7, 2009, at IA (reporting that Health News, an Irvine,
California company that operates a national donor referral service, had a 40% increase since
February 2008) Fertility clinics nationwide report a significant increase in the number of donors
coming forward. See e.g., Juju Chang & Kiran Khalid, Less Money Means More Egg Donors,
ABC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/storyid=6119578&page=l
(stating fertility experts throughout the country reported a 30% to 40% increase in applicants). As
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desperately want a child but cannot reproduce and cannot afford to pursue
1VF. Embryos and/or surrogates may provide the only options. Finally,
need may be cultural as well, particularly when infertility brings shame. 46
Although there is no published data, anecdotally it appears that the use of
surrogates has grown exponentially over just the past few years.47
Second, reproductive technology advances at a truly astounding rate. 48
Many ART procedures are now so common that we lose perspective of how
recently they came into existence. America celebrated the birth of its first
IVF-conceived baby in 1981;49 just twenty-five years later at least 54,656
of 2008 more than 100,000 young women sold or donated eggs to approximately 470 IVF clinics
in the United States. W. Kramer et al., U.S. Docyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and
Psychosocial Issues, 24 OXFORD J. OF HUM. REPROD. 3144, 3144 (2009), available at
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/12/3144.full
46. Mark Alpert, New U.S. Export to Japan: Babies, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/1 992/08/10/76762/index.htm. As an
example, in Japan infertility carries serious social stigma, adoption is frowned upon, and clinics
cannot provide surrogates. Id As a result, at least one American fertility center has been recruiting
Asian American women to serve as surrogates for Japanese clients for the past several years. Id.
Japanese customers use Indian surrogates a well. See Japanese Girl Born to Indian Surrogate
Arrives Home, CNN, Nov. 2, 2008, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-1 I-
02/world/india.baby_ I _indian-law-japanese-girl-jaipur? s=PM:WORLD) (describing a situation
where an Japanese couple paid a clinic in India to have an Indian surrogate implanted with the
husband's sperm and an anonymous donor egg)
47. See Cohen, supra note 45 ("Robert Rupak, president of PlanetHospital, a California-
based medical-tourism country, says that in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or
single parents overseas for surrogacy, nearly three times the number in 2008 and up from just 33
in 2007."); Joseph Gathia, Surrogate Mothers: Outsourcing Pregnancy in India, MERINEWS, June
26, 2008, available at http://www.merinews.com/article/surrogate-mothers-outsourcing-
pregnancy-in-india/136421.shtml; Lorraine Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/2008/03/29/the-curious-lives-of-surrogates.html; and
Amelia Gentleman, Foreign Couples Turn to India for Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2008http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-mother.1.10690283.html (stating that
people are becoming more aware of the process of surrogacy in India).
48. See generally Liza Mundy, Souls on Ice: America's Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise
of Stem Cell Research, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2006, available at
http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-embryo-glut-and-wasted-promise-
stem-cell-research (discussing a wide range of recent developments, including the combination of
more effective fertility drugs and laboratory procedures producing more embryos per cycle,
implantation procedures using fewer embryos, and the fact that a woman recently gave birth using
an embryo that had been frozen for 13 years, which underscores how unclear the future of embryo
storage and usage really is, as professionals do not even know how long frozen embryos will be
"good for" going forward). This may be particularly true of medical technology regarding
embryos. Id.; see also Lucy Laing, Conceived Together, Born II Years Apart: Deep-frozen Third
Sister Arrives After Record Gap, DAILY MAIL, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1341766/Conceived-born- 1-years apart-Deep-
frozen-sister-arrives-record-gap.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2010) (explaining how a woman was
born 11 years after being conceived).
49. Miss Elizabeth Carr was born in Norfolk, Virginia on December 28, 1981. See DEBORA
L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF
CONCEPTION 17, 28 (2006).
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babies were born in the United States using IVF and IVF-related
procedures. 50 We have only been able to store human eggs since 2004.51 In
2007, Europe's first in vitro maturation babies were born.52 We may have
even gotten to the point where women do not need men to create babies. 53
There is little reason to doubt that we will regularly see regular such ART
"miracles" going forward or that the use of reproductive technology will
continue to increase.
The third driving force is the cost and process effectiveness of
purchasing embryos and/or using surrogacy services relative to IVF. IVF
based procedures are not single, point-in-time activities; they are more
accurately a series of steps over different periods of time. The Centers for
Disease Control ("CDC") refers to these as "cycles of treatment" 54 or, for
purposes of this article, "cycles." The average cost for a single cycle of IVF
is $10,000-12,000, but can reach as much as $25,000 if features such as
donor gametes or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) are added.55 And,
50. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2006
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY REPORT 61 (2008) [hereinafter CDC 2006 REPORT]
51. Aina Hunter, Why Worry? Put Your Eggs on Ice!, ABC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4591877&page=1. The difficulty with storing eggs is that
eggs have high water content that tends to produce destructive ice crystals in the egg when frozen.
Id. While data is limited, one study showed that eggs survive the new storage process 85% of the
time. Cherie Black, Seattle Women Now Have Option to Freeze Eggs, SEATTLE PI, Feb. 10, 2008,
available at
www.seattlepi.com/printer2/index.asp?ploc=t&refer-http://www.seattlepi.comlocal/350763 eggf
reezingl l.html.
52. Justin Blau, IVM Babies Just Fine, Thank You, CBS NEWS, June 30, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/30/health/main561011 .shtml. In vitro maturation
("IVM") is similar to IVF. See Tracy Connor, Have a Baby at New Low, Low Price, Says Fertility
Doctor Joel Batzofin, NY DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2009,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2009/04/13/2009-04-
1 3_have a babyat new low lowprice.html (describing the basic procedure for both IVF and
IVM). The key difference is that, in IVF, the egg donor is placed on hormones to stimulate their
ovaries and the eggs are withdrawn when mature. Id. In IVM no hormones are used and the eggs
are removed before maturation. Id.
53. In 2009, British researchers announced that they had taken stem cells from an embryo and
used them to create human sperm. See Peter Allen, Sperm from Stem Cells, CBS NEWS, July 9,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/09/uttm/main5148372.shtml ("Sperm could be
produced from female stem cells. That would mean women would no longer need men to create
babies.").
54. See CDC 2006 REPORT, supra note 50, at 4 ("Because ART consists of several steps over
an interval of approximately two weeks, an ART procedure is more appropriately considered a
cycle of treatment rather than a procedure at a single point in time.").
55. See Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and
Infertility: Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 844, 844
(2006) (estimating the mean cost of IVF in the United States in 2002 at $9,547). Cost varies by
region and clinic. See id. (describing a study of Arab and African Americans living in low-income
areas of the United States that are unable to afford infertility treatment even when clinics offer
discounts or different pricing).
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while the rate of success has grown considerably, most women need more
than one cycle to accomplish pregnancy. 56 It is not uncommon for a person
or couple to spend $100,000 just attempting to conceive using traditional
IVF based procedures. 57 Making IVF even more cost prohibitive is the fact
that the vast majority of states do not require insurance companies to cover,
or offer coverage for, infertility diagnosis and treatment.58 Using embryos
and/or surrogates may decrease total costs, perhaps by 50% or more,59
while also increasing the likelihood of success. 60
Finally, ART use is increasingly common and possibly more socially
acceptable.61 In 1996, there were 64,681 ART cycles performed in the
56. See CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY
CLINIC REPORTS 6 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf
[hereinafter CDC 2005 REPORT] (providing 2005 statistics that of the 97,442 cycles started only
28% resulted in a live birth). Ironically success rates actually decrease with each additional cycle.
Id. at 17.
57. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 36, at 46-47 (projecting the average cost of a single
cycle to be $12,400 while the price of some eggs ranged from $25,000 to $50,000). This is true
even when the patient knows the probability of success is low. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating
Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 632 (1997)
(discussing the recent entrance of women into the ART market who were previously ineligible for
treatment, including the extreme case of a post menopausal woman birthing a son from a donor
egg). Patients are frequently willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a 10% chance of having a baby. See
Melinda B. Henne et al., The Combined Effect ofAge and Basal Follicle-Stimulating Hormone on
the Cost of a Live Birth at Assisted Reproductive Technology, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 104,
107 (2008) (describing a pilot study that found patients in 2005 willing to pay $27,158 for a 10%
chance of delivering a baby).
58. See, State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm (listing current state insurance laws that address
insurance coverage for fertilization procedures).
59. See Stein, supra note 36 (explaining that The Abraham Center provided affordable
options for clients to its fertility bank by charging $2,500 per embryo and an estimated $10,000
for total cost of a pregnancy); see also Wise, supra note 36, at 169 (describing The Abraham
Center's less costly process and report of two women who "shared" a single batch of embryos and
shared costs).
60. See Lynne Peeples, In IVF, Frozen Embryos May Fare Better Than Fresh, REUTERS, Feb.
17, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/17/us-ivf-embryos-idUSTRE61 G4U 120100217
(describing a Finnish study that determined children born from frozen embryos were less likely to
be born prematurely and had a higher birth weight and length). While we cannot say that it is a
well-established medical fact, designer embryos may have higher pregnancy success rates than
non-designer embryos, particularly when the egg and sperm come from donors with an
established track record of achieved pregnancies. See Wise, supra note 36, at 168 n.21 ("[T]hey
can increase the chance of a successful pregnancy from approximately thirty percent to an
impressive seventy percent.").
61. See, e.g., NO BABY ON BOARD, www.nobabyonboard.com/moviestv.html (last visited Jan.
14, 2011) (providing examples of celebrities who publicly acknowledge using IVF to conceive,
including David and Courtney Cox, Marcia Cross, Penn Jillette; moreover, Angela Bassett, Robert
DeNiro, Peri Gilpin, Kelsey Grammar, and Deidre Hall used surrogates). It may even be the case
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United States,62 by 2008 that number increased to 148,055 resulting in
46,326 live births (deliveries of one or more living infants) and 61,426
infants.63 Although ART use is still relatively rare, it has doubled over the
past decade. 64
It is also, arguably, acceptable not only to use ART to try to create life,
but to attempt to create life through designer embryos.65 While some
contend there is no need for such embryos 66 the reality is that there will be
demand for three reasons. First, while there are embryos in storage, 67 the
vast majority is unavailable to prospective parent(s). 68 Second, even if those
embryos were readily available, there are questions about potential
viability.69 Third, it is simply ridiculous to discount the reality that would-
that ART discussions have become social events. See, e.g., Non-profit Organization Holds Egg
Donor/Surrogacy Event in Popular Beverly Hills Nail Salon, GAY NEWSWIRE, Jan. 21, 2010,
http://www.gaynewswire.com/nonprofit-organization-holds-egg-donorsurrogacy-event-
popular-beverly-hills-nail-salon/6192 (posting an invitation to a program "designed to deliver
sensitive and important information about surrogacy and egg donation in a casual, relaxed setting,
where participants enjoy complimentary manicures, pedicure, and martinis").
62. CDC 2006 REPORT, supra note 50, at 61.
63. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2008 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 13 (2008).
64. Idat 65.
65. We say "arguably" because there are certainly opinions to the contrary. See, e.g., Joyce E.
Cutler, Designer Baby Offer to Screen Embryos for Eye, Hair, Skin Pigmentation Dropped, CTR.
FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y (March 4, 2009),
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.phpid=5210.(discussing a California fertility clinic's
decision to withdraw its screening plan due to "apparent negative social impacts."); Daniel Martin,
Couple Pay 9,000 to Have First British Web Baby, DAILY MAIL, Jan. 22, 2007,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-429393/Couple-pay-9-000-British-web-baby.htm
("Stephen Green, national director of Christian Voice, said 'The objection to the idea of designer
babies is that it divorces procreation form the act of sexual congress, and there is a real sense in
which it is playing God."').
66. See, e.g., The Slope is Really Slippery, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 24, 2007,
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/march/24.29.html (discussing the slippery slope that the
Abraham Center is approaching through embryo selection as "the world's first embryo bank").
67. Id. (alleging that there are some 500,000 embryos in cryopreservation in the United
States).
68. Susan Crockin, How do you "Adopt" a Frozen Egg?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2005, at
D12 ("According to a 2003 study, approximately 88 % of those frozen embryos are still under the
active control of the patients who created them and are still trying to create a family with them. Of
the remaining embryos, only about 2 % of patients were found to actually choose to donate their
embryos to another family forprocreation - likely, at least in part, from discomfort over donating
their born child's potential genetic sibling. In my own practice and those of many of my
colleagues, almost 75 % of patients who seriously consider donation ultimately decide not to
donate to another family.").
69. See Jennalee Ryan, The World's First Embryo Bank, FREE REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1676440/posts (pointing out that the quality of
embryos from infertile couples is less than those from a proven egg and sperm donor raising the
pregnancy, with pregnancy rates of 30% and 70% respectively).
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be parents hope to "produce" a child with certain characteristics or
abilities. 70
III. SYMBIOSIS
The embryo market is, at least domestically, a very recent
development 7' and surrogate use increased dramatically over the past few
years. 72 The logical explanation for these developments is the Internet. As
recently as 1999 people advertised in newspapers for human tissue donors73
and only 40% of the American population aged 16-years and older accessed
the Internet. 74 Ten-years later, 74% did75 and the United States currently
has more than 239,232,863 Internet users.76 Global Internet use increased
444.8% from 2000 to 2010.77 As of June 2010, there were approximately
1,966,514,816 Internet users worldwide.7 8 In 1993 the United States ART
industry was estimated at $164 million per year.79 By 2010, that figure
70. See, e.g., Joan O'C.Hamilton, What are the Costs?, 2000 STANFORD MAGAZINE 53, 58
("[F]uturistic scenarios of parents-in-waiting "constructing" a child already have arrived.
Scouring a website where they can select donors, hopeful couples can quickly get caught up in
comparison shopping, where physical features are the stock in trade. "Couples who would have
been looking for someone with a lovely character before [the Internet] now say, 'Well, we like No.
98, but haven't you got someone with a bluer eye?'). It may even be the case that prospective
parents desire characteristics that may not commonly be perceived as desirable. See Sarah-Jay
Templeton, Deaf Demand Right to Designer Deaf Children, SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece (presenting an argument by
the Royal Institute for Deaf and Hard of Hearing People that Deaf parents should be allowed to
screen their embryos so they can choose a deaf child). An American family chose a sperm donor
with a history of family deafness to purposely have a deaf child. Id.
71. See Cohen, supra note 45, at W8 (describing the tremendous increase in facilities,
surrogate pregnancy attempts and number of couples sent overseas between 2005 and 2007,
structuring a market for embryos and surrogacy).
72. Id.
73. That year, a married couple put ads in the Harvard and Princeton newspapers seeking an
egg donor who was 5'10" or taller and who had scored over 1400 on her SATs. Barbara Katz
Rothman, The Potential Cost of the Best Genes Money Can Buy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,
June I1, 1999, at A52, available at http://chronicle.com/article/The-Potential-Cost-of-the-
Best/21979/.
74. INTELLIQUEST, Statistics: Internet, Internet Use (U.S.), MEDIA AWARENESS NETWORK,
May 23,1999, http://www.media-
awareness.ca/english/resources/researchdocuments/statistics/internet/internet use.cfm.
75. Sydney Jones & Susannah Fox, Generations Online in 2009, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1 093/generations-online.
76. North America Internet Users and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/statsl4.htm#north (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
77. Internet Usage Statistics: World Internet Users and Population Statistics, INTERNET
WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2011).
78. Id.
79. Judith Gaines, A Scandal ofArtificial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 1990,
at 23,
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grew to at least $1.7 billion.80 Eighty percent of adult Internet users seek
health information online 81 and reproductive health questions are one of the
most common areas of interest. 82 It is no coincidence that Internet usage
and ART growth mirror each other. The fact is that the Internet allows
prospective ART buyers and sellers to find each other in ways
unimaginable even a decade ago. But the Internet is not only providing
ART access it is shaping, at least, three significant ART ideas.
First, many ART buyers and sellers find each other online, but that
pre-supposes awareness of the existence of the "other party". While it is
impossible to quantify, there is no doubt that some people get the initial
idea to pursue ART activities from the Internet. 83
Second, the Internet fosters the idea that ART is not limited to any
traditional audience. Originally IVF was for married women under the age
of 35 who suffered specific physiological problems and could not conceive
naturally. 84 The Internet makes ART developments available to broader
constituencies. Prominent user groups now include non-married, career
heterosexual women,85 gay 86 or lesbian87 couples, individuals,88 and
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/07/magazine/a-scandal-of-artificial-
insemination.html?scp= I &sq=judith%20gaines&st-cse.
80. See Spar & Harrington, supra note 36, at 47 ("[T]he arithmetic suggests that assisted
reproduction in the United States is at least a $1.7 billion market.").
8 1. Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients and
the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71, 85 (2008). Searching health information
ranks behind only email use and consumer goods and services searches online. Id.
82. See Wolfgang Himmel et al., Information Needs and Visitors' Experience of an Internet
Expert Forum on Infertility, 7 J. OF MED. INTERNET RESEARCH e20 (2005), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1550645 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)
(outlining a German study that analyzed internet traffic to a site answering questions about
infertility medical questions).
83. See Want to Buy My Eggs for $4,000?, SGCLUB.COM,
http://www.sgclub.com/singapore/eggs 4000_china_188402.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
While there are no documented cases, it is difficult to believe that ideas such as purchasing
embryos, much less designer embryos, and becoming a surrogate were not created by people
doing online research in areas ranging from "infertility" to simple current events.
84. See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: How ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS
CHANGING OUR WORLD, 27 (2007) ("We limited our cases at first to those women who had had
their Fallopian tubes removed").
85. See Deborah Apton, More Women Choosing Single Motherhood, ABC NEWS, May 24,
2006, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=1995278&page=l ("California Cryobank, one of
the largest sperm banks in the country, reports that single women make up 32 % of the clients who
buy sperm from its bank.").
86. See Stephen H. Miller, Gay Men's Baby Boom, May 18, 2000
http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/26805.html (alleging that there is a gay men's baby
boom developing fed by the Internet); Guy Ringer, Gay Man, Gay Dad: Gay Men Can Become
Fathers, http://www.theafa.org/library/article/gaymangaydad gaymencanbecomefathers/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2009) (outlining the process for a gay man to start a family).
87. See Paula Amato & Marcy Casey Jacob, Providing Fertility
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straight single men. 89 The Internet also cultivates the development of
"radical" ART concepts. 90
Third, the Internet is epicenter of the idea of Reproductive Tourism
("RT"). While authors discuss the concept of RT differently, 91 here it
means "citizens of one country using reproductive technologies in another."
Commentators address restrictions driving RT users across borders (such as
situations where treatment is unavailable 92 or procedures are locally
illegal),93 but users pursue RT for a variety of reasons 94 including lack of
Services to Lesbian Couples: The Lesbian Baby Boom, SEXUALITY, REPROD. & MENOPAUSE 83,
83 (2004) ("Thirty to 50% of lesbian women of child-bearing age wish to become parents, and
given the current social trends toward same-sex marriage, many will seek to do so with the help
of a sperm donor."). There are clinics that market services specifically to lesbian couples and
individuals. See, e.g., Services, THIE MD, http://www.thiemd.com/infertility.html (last visited
Apr. 26, 2011) (addressing services available specifically for lesbian patients), Co-
ParentMatch.com, Lesbian Sperm Donors, http://www.co-
parentmatch.com/sperm donors/lesbian sperm donors.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (providing
information specifically catered to both lesbian sperm donors and lesbians seeking to get
pregnant).
88. See Berke, supra note 36 (telling the story of a single male in Manhattan who became of
single parent through surrogacy).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 66 (discussing the Texas-based Abraham Center, the
"World's First Embryo Bank" who marketed its services, and attracted clients, online. Its first two
successful procedures involved women from Canada and California and quickly gained potential
clients from England).
91. See, e.g., Guido Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive Tourism in Europe, 19
HUMAN REPROD. 2689, 2690 (2004) ("Reproductive or infertility tourism refers to the movement
of citizens to another state . . . to obtain specific types of medical assistance in reproduction that
they can not receive at home."). The basis of this definition likely comes from Bartha M.
Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical,
and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 333 (1991) (defining "procreative tourism" as people
traveling to exercise "personal reproductive choices in less restrictive states").
92. Sometimes procedures are "unavailable" because medical personnel simply refuse to
perform them. See, e.g., Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of
Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 65 tbl. 6 (2005) (reporting
that one in five treatment providers refuse treatment to unmarried women); Catherine DeLair,
Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by
Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 150 (2000) ("The most
common and the most significant barrier that gays and lesbians face when trying to access
reproductive technologies is physician discrimination and refusal to provide treatment."). In
addition to direct discrimination - refusal to provide treatment - same-sex couples face statutes
that prohibit insurance payments for in-vitro procedures unless for instance, the treatment is
rendered upon their lawful spouse. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note
58 (outlining various state statutes addressing insurance coverage of in vitro procedures).
93. See Lee, supra note 42, at 285 ("[R]egulation that is overly restrictive towards the practice
of surrogacy has not eliminated the practice. Rather it has boosted demand for [reproductive]
tourism.").
94. See generally Elizabeth Ferrari Morris, Reproductive Tourism and the Role of the
European Union, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 701, 703 (2008). See Cortez, supra note 81 (providing a
comprehensive discussion of why patients travel abroad for medical care.
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local medical expertise, lengthy waiting lists,95 cost considerations, 96 and
convenience. 97 RT is a prevalent, 98 and based on growth patterns, soon to
be an enormous ART/Internet consideration because the Internet "facilitates
nearly all facets of medical tourism." 99
It is almost impossible to fathom the future explosion of RT but, while
data is limited, the projections for India provide some perspective. In 2003,
India's Finance Minister announced his country's goal to become a "global
health destination." 00 An estimated 150,000 medical tourists visited India
in 2005, but that number was projected to increase to 450,000 by 2008.0'
Perhaps more telling is that India's RT segment of medical tourism was
approximately $450 million per year in 2006 and is projected to grow by
600% in the near future. 102 A significant portion of this growth is
95. See A Growing Number of Brits Cross the Atlantic for Donor Egg IVF Treatment at
Shady Grove Fertility Center, PR NEWSWIRE, June 16, 2009,
http://news.pmewswire.com/ViewContent.aspx?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-16-
2009/0005044891&EDATE (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) ("In the UK, where egg donors are neither
paid nor guaranteed anonymity, donor eggs are scarce, wait times can be as long as three years
and choice of donor is limited.") Some clinics exist precisely because countries have more
demand than supply. See, e.g., International Egg Donor Prograom, SHADY GROVE FERTILITY,
http://www.shadygrovefertility.com/international (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
96. Fertility treatments in foreign countries may be significantly cheaper. Cost of IVF with
Sperm Donation Abroad, VISITANDCARE.COM, http://www.visitandcare.com/infertility-
treatment-abroad/guides/treatment/ivf-with-sperm-donation/cost (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). As
an example, the average cost for a cycle of IVF is $10,500 in the United States. Id. That same
treatment costs $5,100 in Cyprus, $4,200 in Argentina, and almost 80% less, $2,200, in India. Id.
Prospective users can comparison shop online utilizing estimated costs and user reviews. See, e.g.,
IVF Fertiliy Medical Procedure Country Price Compare Traveling from USA,
ALLMEDICALTOURISM.COM, http://www.allmedicaltourism.com/usa/fertility/ivf-in-vitro-
fertilization/?mic=m62tl88kjf&gclid=CNmwwYWOrpwCFQMNDQodlWSM7w (last visited
Apr. 26, 2011) (allowing users to choose countries to compare pricing).
97. Foreign clinics use online promotions to target frazzled, infertile couples with an
attractive combination: fertility treatments and vacation. See, e.g., My IVF Alternative,
http://www.myivfaltemative.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (offering "vacation style" IVF
procedures in the Czech Republic); IVF Mexico Experts Offer IVF in Mexico, Go SCULPTURA,
http://www.ivfmexicoexperts.com/conversion/mexicocony fertility.htm?OVRAW=IVF%2OVac
ation&OVKEY=ivf/o20abroad&OVMTC=advanced&OVADID-44419002522&OVKWID=2203
92856522 (last visited Apr. 26, 2011) (offering a "pleasurable" IVF vacation experience in
Mexico).
98. See Morris, supra note 94, at 712 ("Reproductive Tourism has become an unmistakable
part of the European landscape.").
99. See Cortez, supra note 81, at 85.
100. Rupa Chinai & Rahul Goswami, Bulletin of the World Health Organization: Medical
Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism,WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/3/07-010307/en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
101. Id.
102. Usha Rengachary Smerdon, Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International Surrogacy
Between the United States and India, 39 CUMB. L. REv. 15, 24 (2008); Linda F. Powers,
Leveraging Medical Tourism, 20 SCIENTIST at 79 (2006).
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attributable to the Internet, specifically user-friendly websites1 03 and
effective, although not necessarily reliable, 104 online advertising.' 05 The
United States, while not attempting to grow RT as India, still has a $3
billion dollar per year industry' 06 and many domestic physicians are
increasingly embracing aspects of RT. 0 7
IV. Regulationl08
"[T]he plain fact is that medical technologies have raced ahead of the
law without the heed of the general public or legislators." 109
In this section we examine international, federal, state, and voluntary
association regulation, or lack thereof, regarding embryo donation and
surrogacy services. While it would be convenient to address the same
directives at each level, we do not have that luxury as regulation ranges
from chaotic to non-existent. Accordingly we are left attempting to address
two general, but significant, topics in each of the following subsections.
First, is there embryo "regulation" and, if so, what is regulated? Second, is
there surrogacy "regulation" and, if so, what is regulated?
A. International Law
There is little international regulation of human embryos. What does
exist primarily focuses on the length of time embryos can be stored. Storage
may be prohibited entirely, 110 limited to one-year,111 two-years,11 2 three-
years, 1l3 five-years,' 14 ten-years, 115 or unlimited.116
103. See Cortez, supra note 81, at 85-86 ("Virtually every hospital that caters to foreign
patients has an English Web site. And these Web sites are increasingly functional. Many allow
patients to schedule treatments, book hotels and airfare, and even contact their surgeon. Patients
can also find medical tourism brokers on the Internet that will liaise with foreign hospitals and
make travel arrangements.").
104. See Smerdon, supra note 102, at 30 (noting that many Indian ART practitioners and
fertility tourism agencies have created websites that "are designed to function as marketing tools
for medical tourism, to attract patients from around the world to India and more importantly, to
the clinic. It is difficult to distinguish actual information from marketing strategies, as the two
often appear to be indistinguishable").
105. Id. at 24 ("Between 2004 and 2006, the number of websites advertising ART more than
quadrupled with marketing heavily geared to foreigners.").
106. See MUNDY, supra note 84, at 4.
107. See Cohen, supra note 45, at DI (noting that the president of a California-based medical-
tourism company stated that "in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or single
parents overseas for surrogacy, triple the number in 2008 and up from just 33 in 2007").
108. While we will discuss aspects of embryo regulation in this section, we will not address
specific stem cell issues as those are beyond the scope of this article.
109. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, art. 8, cmt. , available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upalfinal2002.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
I10. For example, Italy prohibits the storage of donor egg or sperm, and prohibits freezing
embryos for later use. See Assisted Human Reproduction Internationally, HEALTH CANADA (Oct.
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There is more developed surrogacy regulation, both by action and
inaction. Some countries flatly prohibit it;117 others regulate surrogacy by
prohibiting compensation to surrogates,' 18 while still others allow surrogate
compensation.'1 9 Many countries, likely even most, have no national
regulation.120
B. Federal Law
One author asserts that there are federal laws requiring "strict medical
and genetic screenings of the [embryo] donating couple to determine the
1, 2004), www.hc7sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/general/intemational-eng.php (providing
international updates about the legislation of Assisted Human Reproduction).
111. Austria and Denmark limit storage to one year. See IVF Worldwide Unit Directory -
Embryo Bank, IVF WORLDWIDE, www.ivf-worldwide.com/Education/embryo-bank.html (last
visited Mar. 23, 2011).
112. Belarus, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, and the Ukraine allow storage for two
years. Id.
113. Norway and Sweden allow storage for three years. Id.
114. Belgium, Croatia, France, Iceland, and the United Kingdom allow storage for five years.
Id.
115. Finland, Israel, and Spain allow storage for ten years. Id.
116. For example, the United States has no restriction on storage time. Id.
17. Examples of countries that flatly prohibit surrogacy are: Austria, China, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan,Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam. See IVF Worldwide Unit Directory IVF-Surrogacy, IVF
WORLDWIDE, http://www.ivf-worldwide.com/Education/surrogacy-rw.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2011).
118. For example, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom prohibit commercial surrogacy. Id.
119. India, Russia, Israel, and Ukraine allow commercial surrogacy. Id; see also Richard F.
Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57
HASTINGS LJ. 295 (2005).
120. Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan,
Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand,
United States, Uruguay and Venezuela have no surrogacy policy. IVF Worldwide Unit Directory
IVF-Surrogacy, IVF WORLDWIDE, http://www.ivf-worldwide.com/Education/surrogacy-rw.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2011). Ireland is another example of a country that does not have a surrogacy
policy. Eric Scott Sills & Clifford M. Healy, Building Irish Families Through Surrogacy: Medical
and Judicial Issues for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 5 REPROD. HEALTH 9, 9 (2008).
This simply means there is nothing preventing commercial surrogacy in these countries; certainly
some provide such services. See, e.g., Press Release, PRLOG, The Latest About Surrogacy in
South Africa (Jan. 31, 2010), http://www.prlog.org/10512636-the-latest-about-surrogacy-in-
south-africa.html (discussing the current status of surrogacy in South Africa); Rebecca Ponce,
Surrogacy and Adoption in Thailand, SIAM LEGAL INT'L, July 16, 2010,
http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=19371 (discussing the current status of surrogacy laws in
Thailand); Raissa Robles, Womb for Hire - Part 1, ABC-CBN NEWS, June 16, 2009,
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/06/16/09/womb-hire-part-I (discussing the first
commercial surrogacy in the Philippines). It is also possible that there is some regulation at the
state or territorial levels. See, e.g., Assisted Human Reproduction Internationally, supra note I 10
(discussing regulation in Australia and noting that Victoria prohibits compensated surrogacy and
Queensland prohibits all surrogacy.).
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embryo's viability and whether the couple is 'free of any genetic and
communicable diseases."' 121 If such comprehensive legislation exists, we
cannot find it. In fact the opposite is possible; there may be no federal laws
address embryo donor screening. We contend that statutory language and
commentary demonstrates there is some embryo screening and storage
legislation, though it is minimal.
The federal government oversees assisted reproduction and genetic
testing through three agencies: the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"),122 and the
Center for Disease Control ("CDC"). The FDA's term "other reproductive
tissue" should encompass embryos.1 23 Even if that is correct, there are no
more than two regulations regarding embryo collection and storage. The
first merely mandates that all "establishments" engaged in the collection,
processing, storage and distribution of human embryos have their donors
screened and tested for H.I.V., Hepatitis B & C, Chlamydia trachomatis and
Neisseria gonorrhea. 124 The second states only that human tissue must be
stored at an "appropriate temperature."l 25 While these regulations are
nominal and vague, such deficiencies might be explained by accidental
over-sight, but the federal government had an opportunity to clearly
establish embryo quality control regulation and chose not do so.
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992
("FCSRCA") authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
issue regulations establishing certification standards and procedures for
121. Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos as America's Prospective Adoptees: Are
Couples Truly "Adopting" or Merely Transferring Property Rights?, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 133, 138 (2009).
122. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.55, 1271.80 (2006) (establishing that laboratory testing is largely
governed by CMS).
123. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(3) ("Human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products
(HCT/Ps) means articles containing or consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for
implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient. Examples of HCT/Ps
include, but are not limited to, bone, ligament, skin, dura mater, heart valve, cornea, hematopoietic
stem/progenitor cells derived from peripheral and cord blood, manipulated autologous
chondrocytes, epithelial cells on a synthetic matrix, and semen or other reproductive tissue.")
(emphasis added); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1270 (2006) (regulating human tissue transplants); Human
Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and Listing,
66 Fed. Reg. 5452, cmt. II (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1) ("Several comments
questioned the need for the regulation of reproductive cells and tissues, citing current oversight
from professional organizations, other Federal agencies, and States. Comments opposed
registration for programs involved in egg donation, egg retrieval, semen processing, semen
evaluation, or in vitro fertilization (IVF) in assisted reproductive technologies .... We stand by our
decision to extend regulatory requirements to reproductive cells and tissue.").
124. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(a), (c).
125. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.260(b).
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embryo laboratories. 126 The Act defined an "embryo laboratory" as "a
facility in which human oocytes and sperm, or embryos, are subject to ART
laboratory procedures."' 27 However nothing in the FCSRCA establishes
standards or procedures for quality control practices; instead it only requires
that fertility clinics report annual ART success rates. 128 In sum, if there is
any federal embryo quality control regulation, it is minimal1 29 and this
minimal level is intentional.
There is no federal surrogacy legislation' 30 but there is one possibility
in terms of "national" scope, the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"). The
most recent incarnation of that Act was in 2002 ("UPA2002").13' That Act
recognized the need for clarification regarding parentage and surrogacy.132
UPA 2002 mandated that surrogacy agreements were not void per se,133
defined that a surrogate may be paid for her services, 134 and clarified that
gestational surrogate services were not "baby selling."' 35  It further
specified that the intended parents of a child born pursuant to an approved
surrogacy agreement were, with judicial approval, the legal parents of the
child. 136 While ambitious, the Act does not provide definitive guidance. To
date only nine states enacted it, none of them without change, 137 and at
126. Implementation of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992;
Proposed Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Labrotories, 63 Fed. Reg. 60178 (Nov.
6, 1998).
127. Id. at 60181.
128. Id. at 60178. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to 7 (2006) (regulating clinical laboratories). The
Act has been termed by one author as "governmental regulation at is weakest." Brenda Reddix-
Smalls, Assessing the Markey for Human Reproductive Tissue Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our
Eggs, but Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 643, 658 (2008). It is hard to dispute this
contention. To give perspective, in addition to its failure to establish quality control procedures, it
was not even funded until four years after enactment. Id.
129. At least one author flatly contends there is none. See Helen M. Alvare, The Case for
Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
1, 28 (2003).
130. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A
Comparative Legal Analysis, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 91, 103-4 (2002) (showing the
differences between state regulation on the issue).
131. See generally, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 109.
132. Id. at art. 7, cmt. (noting that "[t]housands of children are born in the United States each
year as the result of ART" and therefore, the Act seeks "to clarify definitively the parentage of a
child born under these circumstances").
133. Id. at §801, cmt.
134. Id. at § 801(e).
135. Id. at §801, cmt.
136. Id. at § 807, cmt. However, if the gestational agreement is not judicially validated, the
gestational mother is the legal mother. Id. at § 809, cmt.
137. The states that enacted the Uniform Parentage Act were Alabama, Delaware, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Legislative Fact
Sheet - Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2010),
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least two of those states did not adopt Article 8, the provision addressing
gestational agreements.1 38 There is no case law interpreting UPA 2002 and
its comments.
C. State Law
There is very little specific state embryo regulation and what does
exist is inconsistent and frequently nebulous. Few states have attempted, or
are attempting, to define the legal status of embryos.139 That status is a
particularly compelling issue on many levels but, for purposes of this
article, one aspect is critical. If embryos are "people," they cannot be
bought or sold. 140 If they are "property," disposition can be contracted like
other goods.141 This distinction seems to warrant not just regulation, but a
comprehensive and consistent body of rules. Unfortunately, developed
regulation is sparse and, where it does exist, embryos may be people,
property, or something in between.
Louisiana designates embryos as legal persons,142 while pending
Georgia legislation declares that embryo life begins at the single-cell stage
and that embryos have rights and responsibilities under state law.143 New
http://www.nccusl.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act. The first draft of a
"Model Act" has also been published. Sara Cotton et al., Model Assisted Reproductive Technology
Act, 9 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 55 (2005). To our knowledge it has not yet been reduced to final
form or adopted by any state.
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-819 (repealed 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-401 to -
907 (2009).
139. However 38 states have "fetal homicide" statutes; laws that punish people who kill a
pregnant women and cause the death of her fetus. See Fetal Homicide, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethom.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011). Of those, 21 apply to the earliest stages of pregnancy. Id. This indicates that, while
such states have not statutorily recognized embryos as human beings, embryos are not always
property. On a potentially related note, a New York appellate court recently ruled that a boy, in
utero when his father was killed, had standing to bring a wrongful death action. On a potentially
related note, a New York appellate court recently ruled that a boy, in utero when his father was
killed, had standing to bring a wrongful death action. Seaton v. County of Suffolk, 912 N.Y.S.2d
289, 291 (20 10). This case also indicates that the un-born have some legal rights.
140. See Paige C. Cunningham, Embryo Adoption or Embryo Donation?: The Distinction and
its Implications, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS & HUMAN DIGNITY (Apr. 16, 2003), available at
http://cbhd.org/contentlembryo-adoption-or-embryo-donation-distinction-and-its-implications
141. Id.
142. See L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (1986). Interestingly, in the same year that Louisiana
enacted this law, the United States Supreme Court was clear that it had never implied that an
embryo or fetus was a human being. See Thornbury v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) ("No Member of this Court has ever suggested that a
fetus is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court has not re-visited the issue in the quarter-century since.
143. See Daniel Becker, Georgia Passes Nation's First Embryo Adoption Law, VOICE
MAGAZINE, http://www.thevoicemagazine.com/headline-news/headline-news/georgia-passes-
nations-first-embryo-adoption-law.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2011). The text of the law is
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Mexico gives embryos the status of "fetus" by its broad statutory
definition1 44 and Missouri law is that "the life of each human being begins
at conception."1 45 At the other end of the continuum Michigan recently
passed a statute treating some embryos as property1 46 and Florida law
grants sperm and egg donors joint decision-making regarding embryo
disposition.147 At common law, Texas treats embryos as property by
allowing contract law to determine disposition.148 It appears that Maine,
Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania statutorily recognize a
special "interim" status making embryos more than property but less than
human 1 49 and, while Tennessee has not codified such status, its Supreme
Court held that "[Embryos are] not, strictly speaking, either 'persons' or
'property', but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life."1 50 While there is little
definitive status regulation, there is even less regarding the sale of human
embryos. Louisiana1 5 1 and Floridal 52 statutorily prohibit such transactions,
available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009 10/fulltext/hb388.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2011). The Governor had not signed the bill at the time this article was drafted.
144. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-1 G (2007) (defining "fetus" as "the product of conception
from the time of conception until the expulsion or extraction of the fetus or the opening of the
uterine cavity.").
145. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2010).
146. See Shari Roan, Obama Victory Delights, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster-shots/2008/11/obama-victory-d.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2010).
147. See FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2) (2009).
148. See, e.g., Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 49-50 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that
embryo agreements do not violate public policy because parties are allowed to come to a
voluntary agreement); but see Jodi L. Bender, Snowflakes in Texas? Enacting Legislation to Allow
for Embryo Adoption, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) ("But, in recent years, the
courts and legislature have gradually moved in the direction of giving embryos the legal status of
a person."). The author contends that Texas should adopt an "interim" status and "suggests that
Texas should enact laws that will place a frozen embryo in a unique category not as a person, but
as a special kind of property deserving of extraordinary respect." Id. at 415.
In 2007 the Texas House of Representatives had the opportunity to address HB 1703. HOUSE
COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1703, 8 0th Leg. Reg. Sess. (2007),
available at http://www.thbi.constorage/pdf-files/end-of sessionreport 80.pdf. That Act would
have, in pertinent part, defined a human embryo as a "a genetically complete living organism of
the species Homo [S]apien, from the single-cell zygote stage to eight weeks' development."
Further, the bill would have defined "embryo trafficking" as "creating a human embryo using in
vitro fertilization for the purpose of selling, buying, or transferring for valuable consideration the
human embryo to a person who is not a genetic parent of the embryo or the spouse of the genetic
parent." Id. (explaining that the bill apparently expired during session).
149. See Baiman, supra note 121, at 145.
150. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2006).
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011)
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while Virginia exempts human ovum from its statutory restriction on the
sale of human body parts.153
It may appear fortunate that more states have surrogacy regulation, at
least as compared to embryo regulation, but more is not betterl 54 when it
lacks consistency. Current state regulation primarily addresses two
frequently inter-related areas. The first is the enforceability of surrogacy
agreements themselves. Some states prohibit certain surrogacy agreements
completely, 155 some limit agreements,156 while still others recognize the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts.1 57 The second area is surrogate
compensation. The approach here, again, differs. Some states refuse to
enforce surrogacy agreements if the surrogate receives compensation for
her services158  or make only altruistic surrogacy legal.1 59  Other
jurisdictions prohibit payment to intermediaries used to help provide
surrogates,160 thus likely decreasing the number of potential surrogates
actually available. 161 The end result is that, similar to state embryo
regulation, state level surrogacy regulation varies greatly, in the oft chance
it exists at all. 162
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (2006), repealed by Acts 2007, c.92, cl.2 (2007).
154. As succinctly summarized by one author, "[tlhe law of surrogate motherhood in the
United States is in a state of flux and confusion." Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate
Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2010).
155. See State by State Surrogacy Laws, RAINBOWLAW,
http://www.rainbowlaw.com/surrogacy-adoption-and-ivfll 88-state-by-state-surrogacy-laws
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Examples include Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, New York,
New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.
156. Examples include Nevada, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
157. Examples include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Id.
For a related discussion see Radhika Rao, Surrogacy Law in the United States: The Outcome of
Ambivalence in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 23 (Rachel Cook
et al. eds., 2003).
158. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A)
(2005) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2008) ; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 2010)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-10-102(a) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2005).
159. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(h) (2005); NEv. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(2); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-162(A) (2005).
160. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A) (2006); D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2006); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV) (2006); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 123(2)(b) (McKinney 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165(A) (2006).
161. At least one state takes a slightly different approach and regulates issues such as parental
status in surrogacy relationships. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1-75 (2009) (setting an
intent standard as the determining factor of determining the legal mother of a child brought to
term by a gestational surrogate).
162. For further discussion regarding the status of surrogacy laws by state see Spivack, supra
note 154, at 101 2; see also Surrogacy Laws by State, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY,
http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/surrogacylaws.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
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D. Voluntary Associations
Two entities promulgate aspects of voluntary embryo regulation, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") and a consortium featuring the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM"). The ABA
formally adopted its Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology ("Model Act") in 2008. The Model Act defines an "embryo" as
"a cell or group of cells containing a diploid complement of chromosomes
or groups of such cells (not gamete or gametes) that has the potential to
develop into a live-born human being if transferred into the body of a
woman under conditions in which gestation may be reasonably expected to
occur."l 63 This appears to fall into the "interim" classification previously
discussed1 64 as the embryo is not life, but has the potential to develop into
human life. The Model Act also calls for donation regulation addressing
such issues as relinquishment of future parental and inheritance rights1 65
and donor screening prior to donation. 166 It is unclear if any person or entity
adopted the Model Act.
The ASRM is ". . .a voluntary, non-profit organization devoted to
advancing knowledge and expertise in reproductive medicine, including
infertility, menopause, contraception, and sexuality."1 67 It is ".. .the leading
market force in the field of reproductive medicine."168 The Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) is ". . the primary organization
of professionals dedicated to the practice of assisted reproductive
technologies (ART) in the United States."169 "SART is also extensively
involved in data collection, practice guidelines and standards, government
interaction, quality assurance, and research."170  SART is also
comprehensively involved with a wide variety of entities that have
significant ART interests and concerns. 17 1 ASRM and SART, along with
163. AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008),
available at http://www.abanetorg/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf.
164. Bender, supra note 148, at 414-15.
165. AM. BAR Ass'N, MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH § 102(9).
166. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q.
203, 214 (2008).
167. See Membership Overview, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE (2011),
http://www.asrm.org/join.
168. See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 128, at 673.
169. What is SART?, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE (2011),
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1864.
170. Reddix-Smalls, supra note 128, at 675.
171. See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in the United
States, 39 FAM. L.Q. 727, 735 (2005) ("[B]oth SART and ASRM have continued to cooperate
with and lead initiatives with other organizations and institutions that are stakeholders in ART.
These include the CDC, FDA, NIH, FTC, and members of Congress as well as professional
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the College of American Pathologists ("COP") created the Reproductive
Laboratory Accreditation Program (RLAP). 172 That program proffers
standards for reproductive laboratories and performs on-site accreditation
every two years.173 SART represents 85% of the clinics practicing ART in
the United States174 and as of 2005, two-thirds of SART programs were
RLAP accredited. 175 ASRM appears to adopt an "interim" embryo status
position, "while an embryo deserves greater respect than accorded other
human tissue, since it has the potential to become a human person, it is not
accorded the respect of an actual human being."' 76 This standing would
seem to dictate heightened standards for embryo laboratories, but that is not
the case. The RLAP directives do not discuss embryo donation or storage
specifically and they leave particular procedures to the individual
facilities. 177 This is problematic as fertility clinic's voluntary procedures
vary tremendouslyl 78 and may not be followed at all. 179 While there is very
little voluntary embryo regulation, there is no voluntary surrogate
regulation, other than entity specific standards such as screening.180
organizations such as the American Medical Association (AMA), American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), the American Bar Association (ABA) and consumer
organizations, RESOLVE, the National Fertility Organization, and the American Fertility
Association (AFA)."). SART even conducts its compliance visits in conjunction with the FDA.
See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 128, at 674.
172. Adamson, supra note 171, at 732-33.
173. Id. at 733.
174. See supra note 169.
175. Adamson, supra note 171, at 733.
176. Peter Malo, Deciding Cutosy of Frozen Embryos: Many Eggs Are Frozen but Who Is
Chosen?, DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 307, 312 (2000) (citing ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM.
FERTILITY SoC'Y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY
& STERILITY iii, 29S-30S, ( 1986)).
177. Instead of identifying particular processes or procedures, the Standards speak in general
terms. COLLEGE OF AMERICAN PATHOLOGISTS, REPRODUCTIVE LABORATORY ACCREDITATION
PROGRAM STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION 4 (2009), available at:
http://www.cap.org/apps/docslaboratoryaccreditation/build/pdf/standards-repro.pdf ("There
must be a manual(s) in the laboratory describing all procedures in sufficient detail to assure
reproductibility and competence in the handling of gametes.").
178. See Alvare, supra note 129, at 12-19 (describing a variety of procedures that fertility
clinics engage egg donation and embryo donation).
179. See CTR. FOR GENETICS & SC., RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL OVERSIGHT FOR THE NEW
HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 4 (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/CGSObama.pdf (noting the routine
flouting and inadequacy of federal regulatory oversight of assisted reproductive technologies in
the United States).
180. See infra notes. 227-28.
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V. BECOMING OR UTILIZING A "CYBER PARENT"l81
A. Potential Parental Rights
There are three common classifications of reproductive tissue donors,
"known,"l 82 "unknown"l 83 and "identified."l 84 Most embryo donorship is
unknown as the recipients never know the identity of the donor(s).185 When
donor identity is unknown the donor has no parental rights, so it is unlikely
(although not impossible)186 that an embryo donor would have parental
rights. Surrogates may have a very different legal position.
Surrogacy can create very strong ties between the surrogate and the
resulting childi8 7 and disputes can arise over custody. The fundamental
question at issue is whether surrogates have parental rights over resulting
children. The deceptively simple answer is, perhaps. Courts currently have
very little precedent,' 88 but a thread may be developing.
181. "A person who provides, online, human reproductive materials he or she biologically
produced."
182. There is not yet any case law on point addressing embryo donorship so we borrow from
the well-established case law regarding sperm donation. A "known" sperm donor's identity is
known to the prospective mother. See Justyn Lezin, Misconceptions: Unjust Limitations on
Legally Unmarried Women's Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known
Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 188 (2003) (noting "known donors" as an alternative to
anonymous donors and identifiying them as "men with whom they are not otherwise sexually or
romantically intimate"). Courts tend to order child support more often from known donors,
regardless of any intent of the adult parties. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, 2005 WL 4694579 at * 2
(Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (support ordered for child conceived after woman self-inseminated following
oral sex); S.F. v. State ex rel T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (support ordered
for child conceived when father was passed out drunk); Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (disallowing misrepresentation of contraceptive protection as a defense).
183. An "unknown" or "anonymous" sperm donor is one whose identity or other personal
contact information is undisclosed to either the prospective mother or the child.
184. An "identified" sperm donor donates understanding that any resulting child is given the
donor's personal contact information and personal identification (name, address, city of birth, date
of birth, etc) once the child reaches the age of 18.
185. See, e.g., N. Y. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Becoming an Egg Donor,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/publications/ 127 (April 2009) (noting that most programs taking
egg donations keep donors information confidential).
186. However it is possible, particularly in a designer embryo purchase, that the true parent(s)
could be known as suppliers would likely want aspects of parentage known so as to increase value
of the embryo. It is also probable that the parent(s) would be known in a donation that involves no
embryo supplier, although, these are likely to be quite rare.
187. Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in
Assisted Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 N.W. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 167, 169 (2008).
188. See See Miriam Perez, Surrogacy: The Next Frontier for Reproductive Justice, RH
REALITY CHECK (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/02/23/surrogacy-
next-frontier-reproductive-justice ("The precedents set by the rare cases that do go to court make
up the body of case law that affects the practice of surrogacy nationwide.").
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The most famous surrogate custody case, and certainly the first to
gamer strong public attention, was In the Matter of Baby M.189 Baby M was
a traditional surrogacy case. Mary Beth Whitehead was artificially
inseminated with William Stem's sperm and became the surrogate mother
of the child.190 Whitehead gave birth to a daughter.191 Within 24-hours of
transferring custody to the Stems, Whitehead asked for the baby back and
threatened suicide. 192 She then refused to return the baby to the Stems and
left New Jersey, taking the infant with her. 193 The New Jersey Superior
Court awarded custody of Baby M to the Stems. 194
On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated surrogacy
contracts as against public policy,19 5 remanding the case to family court.19 6
That court awarded William Stem custody and Mary Beth Whitehead the
parental right of visitation.197 Baby M is the most famousl 98
surrogacy/parental rights case, but it is not dispositive of those issues in all
jurisdictions. In fact, if similar issues arose in another state the result might
be quite different. 199 As examples, Ohio would not invalidate a surrogacy
contract under the theory that such contracts per se violate public policy200
and Massachusetts has invalidated a surrogacy agreement on public policy
grounds20 1 but the articulated concerns were different from those in Baby M
189. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
190. Id. at 1236.
191. Id.
192. Id at 1236-1237.
193. Id. at 1237.
194. Id. at 1238.
195. Id. at 1240. Recently, New Jersey built upon Baby M's holding in A.G.R. v. D.R.H. &
S.H., No. FD-09-001838-07 (2009) (invalidating a gestational surrogacy contract as it violated
public policy).
196. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1264.
197. In re Baby M, 542 A.2d. 52, 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
198. While it is the most famous, it is not the most extreme in terms of result. In Baby M the
surrogate was awarded the parental right of visitation, but there is one case where the surrogate
was awarded primary custody. See 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 261, 308 (2005).
199. At least one author argues that surrogacy regulation should be decided exclusively at the
state level. Dale Elizabeth Lawrence, Surrogacy in California: Genetic and Gestational Rights, 21
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 525, 527 (1991) (arguing that surrogacy regulation should be decided
exclusively at the state level).
200. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007) ("We conclude, therefore, that
Ohio does not have an articulated public policy against gestational-surrogacy contracts.
Consequently, no public policy is violated when a gestational-surrogacy contract is entered
into."). The court noted that a traditional surrogate might "have a different legal position." Id. at
742.
201. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998) ( "We simply decline, on public
policy grounds, to apply to a surrogacy agreement of the type involved here the general principle
that an agreement between informed, mature adults should be enforced absent proof of duress,
fraud, or undue influence.").
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and that court recognized that a valid surrogacy agreement could be created
in Massachusetts. 202 While the above cases focused on public policy, there
may be another way to assess the likelihood of surrogate parental rights;
determine who "mom" really is.
Johnson v. Calvert203 arose out of a dispute regarding a surrogacy
contract. Mr. Johnson's sperm was mixed with Mrs. Johnson's eggs and the
fertilized eggs were implanted in the surrogate. 204 Shortly before birth the
surrogate threatened to keep the child unless she was paid monies she
contended due under the agreement. 205 Both sides sought judicial
declaration as the lawful parent(s) of the unborn child. 206 The court had to
choose between the biological parents and the birth mother. It held that
.she who intended to procreate the child - this is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her own - is
the natural mother." 207 The end result was that the biological mother got
custody, not the surrogate. So, California law is clear about who the true
mother is in a surrogacy arrangement. That should then allow us to
conclude that a surrogate has no parental rights, at least in California, but
that may not be true.
There is a potentially critical footnote in Johnson, it states ". . .in a true
'egg donation' situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child
formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as
her own, the birth mother is the natural mother under California law
(emphasis added)." 208 That means that where there is no biological link
between the "intended" mother and the resulting child, the birth mother (the
surrogate), is the mother. The surrogate would then have full parental
rights. This footnote is significant because, while it was not mandatory
authority, a New York appellate court cited Johnson in McDonald v.
McDonald209 and held that the non-biological mother, in a true egg
donation case, was the lawful mother.2 10 Of course it is possible that the
surrogate would not have parental rights if she contacted them away, but
that assumes the applicable state recognizes the validity of surrogacy
202. Id. ("If no compensation is paid beyond pregnancy-related expenses and if the mother is
not bound by her consent to the father's custody of the child unless she consents after a suitable
period has passed following the child's birth, the objections we have identified in this opinion to
the enforceability of a surrogate's consent to custody would be overcome.").
203. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id
207. Id. at 782.
208. Id. at 782 n.10.
209. 196 A.D.2d 7, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
210. Id. at 12.
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contracts. That assumption should not be made. 211 So, does a surrogate
have parental rights? Perhaps.
B. Potential Parental Responsibilities
Historically, biological parents had financial responsibilities for their
children, 212 but embryo donors would not want such obligations and likely
would not have them under common or statutory law. As previously
discussed, most embryo donation is anonymous because parties contract
with fertility clinics to provide them with an embryo; they have no contact
with the donor and do not know the donor's identity.2 13 This makes them
"unknown" donors. Common law is well settled that unknown tissue donors
usually have no parental responsibilities, while known donors do.2 14
Twelve states also statutorily address this issue. 215 The most common
position is that a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction.2 16 Additionally, tissue donors may be able to contract
away parental responsibilities, although this approach is far from well
211. See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text. See also Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour,
Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 445 (2004) ("A survey conducted in December 2000 revealed that
approximately eleven states expressly permitted gestational agreements by statute or case law. Six
states statutorily declared such agreements void. Approximately eight states enacted statutes to
ban gestational agreements that pay compensation to the gestational woman . . . . The survey
further revealed that courts in two states refuse to recognize gestational agreements."). For further
discussion and breakdown see GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW, Primary
Sources Surrogacy Agreements,
http://libguides.law.gsu.edu/content.php?pid=122829&sid=1055848 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
212. See Child Support Laws State by State, CHILD SUPPORT LAWS STATE BY STATE.COM,
http://www.child-support-laws-state-by-state.com/child-support.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2010).
213. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (noting that recipients never learn donor's
identity); but see supra note 177 (stating that the RLAP directives are general in nature).
214. See. e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernen, 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 364 (2002) (stating the general
rule: "[w]e agree with the defendant that if the use of donors in artificial insemination proceedings
is permitted in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the donor should be protected from [parental]
liability to the donee").
215. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (2009 & Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 742.11, .13-.14, 17 (2010 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-122, :124, :126-
127, :129-130, :132 (2008 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, :15 (2010); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-02, 14-20-60 to -61 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (2008);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 556 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.102, .702-.703, .7031
(2007 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 781-15-102, -702-703 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§
20-156, -158 (2008); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011, .705, .710 (2005 & Supp. 2010);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-402, -902-903 (2009).
216. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (2009 & Supp. 2010).
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settled.217 Currently embryo donors are not likely to have parental
responsibilities; that may not be the case for surrogates. 218
As discussed earlier, a surrogate may have parental rights either due to
a biological relationship to the resulting child or because the applicable
jurisdiction holds that the birth mother is the legal mother. 219 If she can
have parental rights, it is only logical that she would have parental
responsibilities. It is possible that she might contract those away but, as
previously discussed, surrogacy contracts are not enforceable in all
jurisdictions.220
VI. POTENTIAL LIABILITY
A. The Embryo Business
1. Warranties
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs the sale of
goods. 221 While there is a great deal of discussion of whether or not human
reproductive materials should be goods,222 we contend, for purposes of this
217. See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernen, 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 364 (2002), affd, 855 A.2d.
121 (Pa. 2004), aff'd, 868 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore and
callously disregard the interests of the unheard-from third party, a party who without their privity
to the contract renders it void. No other party, albeit a parent, can bargain away a child's support
rights.").
218. The opposite may be true as well. If UPA 2002 was adopted, specifically Article 8,
prospective parents who entered into non-validated surrogacy agreements, and later refused to
"adopt" the resulting child, could be responsible for support of the child. See UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT art. 8 cmt.
219. See supra notes 181-211 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 147-150.
221. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2010).
222. As we will discuss, human embryos are legally be bought and sold. However, the
"properness" of such transaction is far from settled on an economic theory, ethical, or moral basis.
See, e.g., Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation,
2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 162-63 (2001) ("The rationales for the prohibition of the
commodification of organs are either internally irrational or are not applicable to oocyte donation
due to its unique technical and social aspects. Additionally, oocyte-specific arguments
misconstrue the potential applications of such technology and fail to conform with broader social
treatments of noncoital reproduction and freedom to contract."); Gregory Pence, De-Regulating
and De-Criminalizing Innovations in Human Reproduction, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009)
("Public intellectuals ... claim that such innovation wrongly commodifies life. I believe that the
opposite is true: money fueled stupendous breakthroughs in assisted reproduction and such market
forces will continue to be good for babies and for the infertile couples who want them."); Radhika
Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of Compensation for Egg
Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1058 (2006) ("Allowing human
eggs to be bought and sold ... treats the sacred components of human life as a form of property,
engendering an attitude of disrespect for actual personn."); Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality,
and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 487, 511 (2006) ("In a sense, these
270
2011] OUTSOURCING HUMAN REPRODUCTION 271
article, that human embryos are goods. The UCC defines "good[s]" as "all
things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale ... ."223 Embryos are transported from place to place 224 and embryos
are sold.225 Embryos are goods and their sale can be governed by the UCC.
a. Express Warranties
Pursuant to UCC Article 2, any oral or written promise relating to the
good at issue can create an express warranty. 226 Accordingly, statements
that an embryo donor was screened for, or is free from, certain diseases or
medical conditions can constitute an express warranty. Embryo suppliers
attempt to distinguish themselves by promoting such standards in their web
advertising, thus creating express warranties. 227
transactional procreative arrangements reduce the missing sex to the products of their reproductive
abilities: sperm, ova, gestation, labor, and birth, and the ultimate product of the transaction, the
child, to a commodity."). See also Matthew H. Baughman, In Search of Common Ground: One
Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate Over Contract Surrogacy, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 263,
279-80 (2001) (differentiating contracting to sell and purchase renewable reproductive services
from the concept of selling and purchasing a child); Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our
Genes: Are Egg Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 426 (2008)
(exploring implications of viewing donor eggs as commodities on potential product liability tort
actions).
Much of the discussion on this topic focuses on whether or not reproductive materials are, or
should be, "property." See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV.
163, 181-82 (2000) ("Whoever has the power to donate (or refuse to donate) the organ can be said
to possess a property right, albeit it of a limited kind."); Rao, supra, at 1066 ("Constructing the
body as a form of property . . . would imply not only freedom from physical invasion, but also
freedom to instrumentalize the body by technologically manipulating it or otherwise putting it to
productive use."); Andrew Wancata, No Value for a Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-
Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 223 (2004) ("Legal scholars and
property theorists, as well as judges, have found it very difficult to speak of human body parts
without resorting to masking them in property terminology."); see generally Elizabeth E. Appel
Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 75, 85-95 (2008) (contrasting
benefits and shortcomings of viewing body parts as property); R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones:
Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26 NOVA L. REV. 421, 424-30 (2002) (examining
historical treatments of the market value of corpses and human tissue).
223. UCC § 2-105 (2010).
224. "Movement" occurs when the embryo is implanted into the uterus.
225. See, e.g., Pregnancy with Donated Embryos: Embryo Adoption, CALIFORNIA
CONCEPTIONS,
http://www.californiaconceptions.com/index.php?option-com-content&view--article&id=47&lte
mid=69 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (noting that the program has a lower cost than alternatives,
indicating that a sale of embryos is involved).
226. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) ("Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.").
227. See, e.g., Pregnancy with Donated Embryos, supra note 225 ("All donors who choose to
anonymously donate through this program are thoroughly screened for infectious diseases and
meet all state and federal regulation. Donors that provide embryos have also been screened for
health risks including inherited disorders, mental illness, and other traits that would be undesirable
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Some embryo suppliers also specifically warrant attributes or
qualifications of donors through donor profiles,228 although they may
actually warrant more than they expect. While suppliers may believe they
only promise that a donor has certain characteristics, they may actually
warrant characteristics of a resulting child. An oral or written promise
creates an express warranty, but a sample or model also does so when it is
"part of the basis of the bargain." 229 If a photograph or biography of a
donor constitutes a model, 230 the purchaser may expect the resulting child
to have the model's characteristics. 231 Most reasonable people recognize
that a child's characteristics may differ greatly from those of a genetic
parent, but it is not well settled that reliance on an express warranty must be
to most parents."); UCSF Medical Center, Embryo Donor Program for Recipients,
http://coe.ucsf.edu/ivflembryodonation_program for recipient.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011)
("Donors are carefully screened by our Embryo Donation Program team. In screening donors, we
adhere to the guidelines from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the United States
Food and Drug Administration, and to the university's institutional ethics board.").
Unfortunately, it may be that these promises are regularly broken. See Martin Curie-Cohen et al.,
Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED.
585, 586 (1979) (revealing that many physicians failed to adequately screen donors for diseases
and many screenings were limited to merely questioning donors about common familial diseases);
Kerry Cork, Comment, Test-Tube Parents: Collaborative Reproduction in Minnesota, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1996) (noting that while it is possible that physicians have
engaged in more rigorous screening in intervening years, there are few safeguards to actually
ensure such practices).
228. Most profiles and databases are proprietary and cannot be accessed by the general public.
See, e.g., MIRACLES WAITING.ORG, http://miracleswaiting.org/membersonly3/modules/sections/
(last visited Jan. I1, 2011). We expect the embryo market to develop similarly to the human egg
market. We provide the following egg examples to give context to what embryo donor advertising
is likely to look like.
A link to a sample donor profile form is available at http://www.elitefertility.com/egg-donor-
profile-database.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). For a sense of how many donors may be
available see THE EGG DONOR CENTER, http://www.theeggdonor.com/eggdonors.php (last
visited Jan. 16, 2011) (noting that he Egg Donor Center Database "has 6412 prescreened egg
donors, 642 interviewed and approved egg donors, and 18 currently unavailable egg donors on
file"). For a "menu board" of donor photos see Egg DONATIONS, INC.,
http://www.eggdonor.com/?page=donordb (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
229. U.C.C. § 2-313(2)(a) (2010) ("Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.").
230. To our knowledge, no court has decided this specific issue. It is impossible to accurately
predict how a court would likely rule as the UCC provides no guidance for determining what
constitutes a model.
231. See, e.g., Cahifornia Cryobank Introduces Celebrity Look-a-LikesTM for Sperm Donors,
CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK, http://www.cryobank.com/About-us/Press-
Releases/template.cfm?id=1396 ("The number one client question we get is 'Who does this donor
look like?' says Scott Brown, Communications Manager for California Cryobank. 'We decided
this would be a great way to give thorough and consistent answers. Clients love it. Donor Look-a-
Likes'm has only been available for a week and our website traffic is up 50%."'). See also E:60
Sperm U, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=3554822&categoryid=null (last visited Jan. 16,
2011)
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reasonable.232 Embryo suppliers that fail to meet promised standards of
donor screening would certainly be liable for breaching expressed
232. See James J. White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty Law, 72 TUL. L. REV.
2089, 2100 n.31 (1998) ("In many states there are cases taking irreconcilable positions regarding
whether reliance by the buyer is required for express warranty liability. While some cases from
each of the following jurisdictions require reliance, there are others in most of these jurisdictions
that grant recovery without explicitly mentioning reliance. See, for example, in Maryland: Worm
v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL 368062 at 5 (D. Md. Nov. 30,
1992) ("The court would have to find that such representations induced the Worms to purchase
Scepter... Because the literature upon which the plaintiffs rely did not exist in 1987 and plaintiffs
therefore could not have relied on it . . . it did not become part of the basis of the bargain.");
Illinois: Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382, 385 (lll. App. Ct. 1976) ("Cases under
the present day Commercial Code . . . require a reliance by the buyer upon the promise,
affirmation or description."); cf. Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver Co., 553 N.E.2d 793, 798 (111. Ct.
App. 1990) ("The trial court was not obligated to accept the plaintiffs argument that the sales
brochure created an express warranty . . . given the fact that Adolphson testified that he did not
rely on the sales brochure. . . ."); but see Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (111. App. 1997)
(citation omitted) ("The trial court's ruling that the statements of the seller could not have been
part of the basis of the bargain simply because no reasonable persons could have relied upon those
statements was erroneous. The trial court misconstrued the role of reliance in determining whether
an affirmation of fact or description is part of the basis of the bargain. Affirmations of fact made
during the bargain are presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain unless clear, affirmative
proof otherwise is shown . . . . It is not necessary, therefore, for the buyer to show reasonable
reliance upon the seller's affirmation. . . ."); New York: Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903,
904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (citation omitted) ("A necessary element in the creation of an express
warranty is the buyer's reliance upon the seller's affirmations or promises."); Pilch, Inc. v. L & L
Started Pullets, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 6513 (CSH), 1987 WL 9430, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987)
(citation omitted) ("In order to succeed on an express warranty theory under [2-313], it is
necessary for the purchaser to plead and prove that the written promotional literature in question
was furnished to buyer prior to the purchase, and relied upon him [sic] in making the purchase.");
Shapiro Budrow & Assocs., Inc. v. Microdata Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3589 (CBM), 1986 WL 2756, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1986) (quoting Eddington v. Dick, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (City Court,
Geneva County, 1976)) ("In order to make out a cause of action for breach of express warranty,
the buyer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, 1) an affirmation of fact or
promise by the seller; 2) the natural tendency of the said affirmation or promise was to induce the
buyer to purchase goods; 3) that the buyer purchased goods in reliance thereon....'"); cf
Tecnoclima, S.p.A. v. PJC Group of New York, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 4437 (CSH), 1993 WL 404109,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993) ("The finder of fact could determine that Circle relied on the
specifications in assessing the marketability of the boiler/burner combination. Such a finding
would support a claim for breach of express warranty."); but see CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g
Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted) ("This view of "reliance' - i.e., as
requiring no more than reliance on the express warranty as being a part of the bargain between the
parties - reflects the prevailing perception of an action for breach of express warranty as one that
is no longer grounded in tort, but essentially in contract. The express warranty is as much a part of
the contract as any other term. Once the express warranty is shown to have been relied on as part
of the contract, the right [to damages] for its breach does not depend on proof that the buyer
thereafter believed that the assurances of fact made in the warranty would be fulfilled."); Rogath
v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (""Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full knowledge and
acceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a breach of warranty under the
terms of the contract, the buyer should be foreclosed from later asserting the breach . . . unless the
buyer expressly preserves his rights under the warranties . . . On the other hand, if the seller is not
the source of the buyer's knowledge, e.g., if it is merely "common knowledge" that the facts
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warranties. Suppliers making a promise of resulting characteristics through
a model, and failing to deliver those characteristics, may also be liable for
such breach.
warranted are false . . . , the buyer may prevail in his claim for breach of warranty'");
Massachusetts: Sprague v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 91-40035-NMG, 1995 WL 376934, 3 (D.
Mass. May 10, 1994) (citation omitted) ("In an express warranty claim, plaintiff must show
reliance on such warranty."); Stuto v. Coming Glass Works, Civ. A. No. 88-1150-WF, 1990 WL
105615, 5 (D. Mass. July 23, 1990) ("This court believes that some minimum of reliance is a
required element of a breach of express warranty claim. . . ."); cf. Roth v. Bay-Stel's Hair Stylists,
Inc., 470 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. App. 1984) (noting that "the hairdresser testified that he had
read the information printed on the box, and, relying on it, he recommended its use to Judith
Roth"); Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611, 617 (Mass. 1982)
(noting that "the trial judge found that Hannon relied on Aquatech's brochure"); Jacquot v. Wm.
Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Mass. 1958) (noting that "Mrs. Jacquot ... relied upon
these express warranties"); but see Wechsler v. Long Island Rehabilitation Ctr. of Nassau, Inc.,
No. Civ. A. 93-6946-13, 1996 WL 590679, at 22 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996) ("The trustee is
not required to establish that in connection with a specific account receivable it purchased, Towers
relied on the factual truth of each of the representations and warranties; what must be shown is
that Towers relied on the fact of the warranties, that is, the promise itself that the representations
and warranties were true .... "); Kentucky: Overstreet v. Norden Lab., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286, 1291
(6th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) ("A warranty is the basis of the bargain if it has been relied upon
as one of the inducements for purchasing the product."); Nebraska: Vlasin v. Shuey, No. A-91-
324, 1993 WL 61875, 1 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1994) ("Nebraska case law has long held that the
assertion of a fact or promise by a seller concerning goods, which is relied upon by the buyer and
which tends to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, is an express warranty."); Hillcrest
Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb. 1990) (citation omitted) ("This court
has held that "since an express warranty must have been "made part of the basis of the bargain," it
is essential that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty."'); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban
Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985) (citation omitted) ("Since an express warranty
must have been "made part of the basis of the bargain,' it is essential that the plaintiffs prove
reliance upon the warranty."); Indiana: Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44
n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) ("The requirement that a statement be part of the basis of the
bargain in order to constitute an express warranty "is essentially a reliance requirement....'");
Kansas: Ray Martin Painting, Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D. Kan. 1986) (citation
omitted) ("Whether the statements about the coating ability of the Amerlock created an express
warranty depends on whether they were "part of the basis of the bargain' which, under Kansas
law, requires some type of reliance on the part of the buyer."); Mississippi: Global Truck & Equip.
Co., Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Miss. 1986) ("Given the
express language used in U.C.C. section 2-313 and the majority of the cases holding that the
buyer must both be knowledgeable of and rely on the affirmation of fact before an express
warranty is created, the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the statements contained in the Palmer brochure were relied upon by Randall prior
to or contemporaneously with the making of the contract between Global and Palmer. Therefore,
recovery under the theory of breach of express warranty is also precluded."); Washington: Casper
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (citation omitted)
("If, in fact, Mr. Warr assured Brad Casper that Velpar could be applied safely during November
or December of 1990, and Mr. Casper relied upon that affirmation of fact in deciding to have
PureGro treat his fields, an express warranty was created.")).
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b. Merchantability
"Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is [automatically] implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."233 "Merchantable"
means the goods "are fit for the ordinary purposes for which [they] are
used."234 The U.C.C. defines a merchant as:
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
having such knowledge or skill.235
Most embryo suppliers are merchants, for purposes of the U.C.C., pursuant
to the "deals in" definition, and quite probably under "knowledge and skill"
as well. Most embryo donors probably are not merchants under "knowledge
and skill," 236 but might be under the "deals in" standard.237
Embryo donors and suppliers have little to fear when it comes to the
issue of breach of warranty of merchantability because this warranty only
requires that embryos be "reasonably fit" for their ordinary use (attempted
conception). The warranty does not guarantee a resulting child, much less
one with specific characteristics. Absent extreme circumstances 238 it is
unlikely that donors or suppliers would breach this warranty. 239
233. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
234. Id. at § 2-314(2)(c).
235. Id. at § 2-104(l).
236. For an analogy, see Jayanti supra note 222, at 433 ("[T]he egg [donor] is usually less
knowledgeable than the 'consumer,' the recipient parents.").
237. See Jayanti, supra note 222, at 432 (contending that human tissue donors are "...not often
engaged in the business' of selling or otherwise distributing [tissue]" and cannot be merchants
under the U.C.C.). See, e.g., County of Milwaukee v. Northrop Data Systems. Inc., 602 F.2d 767,
771 (7th Cir.1979) (noting that the question of whether a party is a merchant for purposes of the
U.C.C. is a question of law). As such determination must be made on a case by case basis, we
cannot say that all embryo donors are merchants and subject to the U.C.C.. Certainly some may be
and it is likely that most, if not all, egg suppliers are merchants for purposes of the U.C.C. as well.
238. Obvious examples are providing embryos damaged during collection, storage, or
transportation such that they cannot be gestated.
239. While rare, embryo donors and suppliers are protected by statute in some jurisdictions
from this cause of action and the one discussed next. As an example, South Carolina has a statute
that states "The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a
contract for the sale, procurement, processing, distribution, or use of human tissues . . . ." S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-43-10 (2002 & Supp. 2010). As previously discussed, the FDA classifies human
embryos as reproductive tissue. See supra text accompanying note 123.
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c. Fitness for a Particular Purpose
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exists "where
the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods." 240
Responsible embryo donors and suppliers presently have little to fear from
this warranty because embryos satisfy only the general purpose of
attempted procreation, not any promise of characteristics in a resulting
child. ART has not yet advanced to the point where we can control specific
aspects of reproduction. 241 However ART is evolving rapidly and, if the
time comes when we can control those types of characteristics, then donors
and suppliers must be aware that asking prospective recipients to designate
a donor's personal characteristics can create a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. A prospective client could view such questions as a
"checklist" for the desired characteristics of the resulting child. They could
then view such items as akin to a menu and they would expect to get what
they ordered. Human tissue suppliers currently ask recipients for certain
designations but, for now, they remain attempts to discern preferences, not
actionable promises.242
2. Strict Product Liability
The rational for the tort of strict product liability is simple; products
can cause harm or injury to users and manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors should absorb the cost of these injuries rather than end-users. 243
Strict product liability has specific elements that an injured party must
240. U.C.C. § 2-315.
241. As examples, it cannot yet control characteristics such as height, eye color, intelligence,
or athleticism.
242. This is a different conclusion than reached under breach of express warranty because it is
a different cause of action. The seller creates an express warranty, but a warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose is actually created by the buyer, when he or she causes a seller to know that the
buyer is relying on the seller's expertise in making a purchase decision. See supra text
accompanying note 231. Admittedly it is an assumption, but we assume that an embryo donor or
supplier (seller) who is aware that a would-be donee (buyer) is relying on their expertise, would
inform the would-be donee that there is no guarantee that a child will have the characteristics of
the donor. We also understand that a donor or supplier may know of a donee's particular purpose
(donee said that she wants an embryo that used eggs from a 5'4", 115 lb., brown-haired, blue-
eyed world class cyclist because donee wants a child that will grow up to be a 5'4", 115 lb.,
brown-haired, blue-eyed world class cyclist) but might not inform the donee that a child
conceived using eggs from this donor may not have these characteristics. In that case there is a
breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
243. See Seldon J. Childers, Don't Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for Embedded
Sofiware, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 134 (2008).
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satisfy to recover. While these elements are addressed collectively and
separately, all discussions encompass the following:
1. There must be a product 244 that causes an injury. The product must
be sold in the same condition, or substantially the same condition, as when
reaching the consumer or user.245
2. The product must contain a defect and the defective condition must
make the product "unreasonably dangerous." 246 "Unreasonably dangerous"
is ". . .dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." 247 There are three
potential types of defects: manufacturing, design, and warning. 248
3. Finally, the plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the product.
An injury is actual harm or loss to the party's person, land, or chattel. 249
There is no question that reproductive tissue can cause damage to a
recipient, resulting fetus, or resulting child,250 but this does not
automatically mean that strict product liability is a viable cause of action in
such situations. In order to assess potential liability under this doctrine we
must determine if the requisite elements can be satisfied. While no case has
decided this issue, one can provide a partial template for analysis.
American Economy Insurance v. Schoolcraft25 1 contained a variety of
strict product liability derivative claims252 In that case one of the plaintiffs
was implanted with embryos that carried the cystic fibrosis gene. She gave
birth to fraternal twins. The daughter was quickly diagnosed with the
disease. 253 American Economy did not address the merits of any of its strict
product liability causes of action, so we begin by addressing a question it
did not: are embryos "products?"
244. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 7.031 (4th ed. 1990) (noting
that the courts define "product" very broadly).
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
246. Id. at § 402A(l) ("One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property").
247. Id. at § 402((A), cmt. i.
248. See generally William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products
Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 639, at n. 50 (1991) ( "[Other courts] use a different test depending
on whether the case involves a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a warning.").
249. FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, 1-8 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8.01[4] (2004).
250. See, e.g., Laurence Mascola & Mary E. Guinan, Screening to Reduce Transmission of
Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1354, 1354 (1986) ("[Slexually transmitted organisms have been transmitted during artificial
insemination by donor, and such transmission can cause . . . disease in the recipient woman and
may harm the fetus or newborn.").
251. 551 F.Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2007).
252. Id at 1237.
253. Id.
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A product is defined as "something produced by human or mechanical
effort or by a natural process.254 It is also a "commodit[y] for sale."255
Embryos are created by a natural process in the female body and can be
sold to prospective parents. Embryos are products.
The second element is that the embryo had a defect that made it
unreasonably dangerous. A product is defective when it is dangerous
beyond the expectations of an ordinary user. 256 If an ordinary user would
not expect an embryo to carry a strong predisposition toward a specific
disease, in this case cystic fibrosis, the embryo is defective.
Finally, there must be an actual injury or loss to person or property
caused by the defective embryo. At a minimum, a child who is born with
cystic fibrosis has experienced, and will experience, several legally
recognized and compensable injuries: she has been damaged in her
enjoyment of life, suffered and will suffer physical and mental pain,
endured past medical expenses, and is very likely to incur future medical
expenses.257 The end result of this analysis is that human embryos can be
products that have defects resulting in injury and triggering strict product
liability. Embryo donors and suppliers have significant reason to fear this
cause of action.258
3. Negligence
Claimants have alleged negligence in holding facilities' methods,
storage and dissemination of human reproductive materials. These suits
involved two different contentions. In the first, the claimant wanted
reproductive materials stored and distributed to a specified recipient, but the
facility failed. 259 For purposes of this article, we term these "lost embryo"
254. See RANDOM HOUSE, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/product (last visited Jan. 16,
2011).
255. See Wordnet Search, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY,
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
256. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
257. J. Brad Reich & Dawn R. Swink, You Can't Put the Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential
Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 1,
52(2010).
258. One author would likely disagree with this conclusion and presents a number of possible
defenses. See Jayanti, supra note 222, at 432-35. She appears to be alone in this contention and,
as previously discussed, we find her logic repeatedly flawed. See Reich & Swink, supra note 257,
at 302-315
259. See, e.g., Stanton v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 997 S.W.2d 628, 628 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (stating that a lawsuit against the health center came after the claimant's sperm was
disposed without notifying him); Harnicher v. Univ. Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998)
(stating that the plaintiffs brought suit after the center used a different donor's sperm for in vitro
fertilization than the couple had selected); see also Dorinda Elliot & Friso Endt, Twins - with Two
Fathers: A Fertility Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38 (reporting that one
mother found that a technician reused a pipette that still contained sperm from a previous
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cases because, even if the embryo was used for conception, it did not reach
the intended recipient. In the second, a child was born with a birth defect
attributable to an embryo that should have been removed through adequate
screening or testing. We term these "defective embryo" cases.
a. Lost Materials and Wrongful Birth
There are a number of reported embryos cases. 260 According to one
source, such accidents are exceedingly rare,261 but perhaps not as rare as he
espouses. In fact, they might happen with disturbing regularity. 262 We
contend that lost materials cases will become even more common as people
increasingly utilize forms of ART, but are claimants likely to recover under
a negligence theory? We must review the traditional elements of that cause
insemination so she was pregnant with another man's baby); Michael Lasalandra, Woman, Ex and
Hospital Settle over Sperm Mixup, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 27, 1998, at 12 (reporting that a couple
settled with a hospital after learning that the wrong sperm was used to impregnate her during an
in-vitro fertilization).
260. See, e.g., Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (the
central claim of the case was negligent destruction or loss of pre-implantation embryos, the
claimants were very concerned that the missing embryos may have been mistakenly implanted in
another woman); Robert B. & Denise B. v. Susan B., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (2003) (involving a
lawsuit against a woman who gave birth to a child as a result of the fertility clinic placing the
wrong embryo in the woman's uterus); Creed v. United Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (involving an action for negligence against a company, hospital, and physician for
implanting a wife's fertilized ova in the wrong woman); Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.2d 231
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (involving a couple whose embryo was planted into another woman's
uterus); Stephanie Smith, Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, CNN NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://articles.cnn.comI/2009-09-22/health/wrong.embryo.familyI fertility
clinic-embryos-savages?_s=PM:HEALTH; Quincy Couple Sue Boston Hospital Over Destroyed
Embryos, PATRIOT LEDGER (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.patriotledger.com/news/cops and courts/x 1l25039407/Quincy-couple-sue-Boston-
hospital-over-destroyed-embryos.
261. See Smith, supra note 260 ("Cases like these, while tragic, are exceedingly rare, said Dr.
David Adamson, a reproductive endocrinologist and past president of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)."). This article further states that "'[t]here are well in excess of
100,000 embryo transfers every year in this country,"' and "'[tihe fact that this happens once in
several hundred thousand embryo transfers means the majority of the time, systems do protect this
from taking place."' Id This is suspect because the "systems" the doctor appears to refer to are
ASRM protocol recommendations such as labeling embryos with the patient's name and/or social
security number or otherwise specifically identifying ownership. Id. However, these are
recommendations only and, as previously discussed, there is no mandated quality control. See
supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
262. A representative of the United Kingdom IVF clinics estimates that one in one thousand
IVF embryos are implanted into the wrong woman. Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You
My Child? The Role of Genetics and Race in Defining Relationships after Reproductive
Technological Mistakes, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 15, 25 (2002). For a comprehensive
history of ART "mix-up" cases and events, see Leslie Bender, "To Err is Human "ART Mix-ups:
A Labor-Based, Relationship Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443, 446-53 (2006).
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of action: duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm263 to determine
potential liability.
It is easy to envision victims in lost embryo situations suing both the
medical professionals involved and the storage entity (such as a fertility
clinic), however there is one initial, and critical, difference. While medical
professionals' duties are well established,264 the legal duty of storage
entities is not.265 This uncertainty is the direct result of a lack of laws
governing the embryo industry. As previously discussed there is little
federal regulation addressing embryo donor storage266 and we are not aware
of any at the state level. Statutes can create legal duties, but statutory
regulation is almost non-existent, so we cannot say there is any truly
established duty. Without a clearly defined duty, it is very difficult to prove
a resulting breach.267
Unlike duty and breach, proximate cause in lost embryo cases is easily
established. When embryos did not reach the intended recipient, and
additional materials are not available from that donor, the contention is that
but for defendant's failure to provide the appropriate embryos to the
appropriate recipient, conception from that particular donor would have
been possible. In the case where embryos were provided to the wrong
recipient, and conception resulted, the contention is that but for the
defendant's failure to provide the embryos to the intended recipient, the
resulting child would not exist.
Harm is highly problematic in lost embryo cases because a court must
determine whether a) a party has suffered actual damage and, if so b) how
to calculate such damage.268 As discussed under causation, lost embryo
damages could arise in two different scenarios. The first is where the
opportunity to procreate using a specific donor is simply gone because
263. See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 696 (2003) (involving a
case of negligence where the court went through each element and analyzed them).
264. For example, in New York, a physician has a duty to use reasonable care and exercise the
degree of skill and knowledge that is ordinarily possessed by physicians in the community. See
Pepe v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the standard of whether
a doctor is liable for malpractice is if he fails to use his best judgment in applying his knowledge
and skill); Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898) (stating that the doctor had a duty to
use reasonable care and diligence in exercising his skill); and Zellar v. Tompkins Cmty. Hosp.,
508 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (stating that a doctor must use his professional skill
and judgment).
265. But see Jaynti, supra note 222, at 441 (arguing that a duty could be recognized under a
"risk imports relation" theory). There are no cases of record finding such a duty.
266. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
267. See Jaynti, supra note 222, at 436 (stating that the egg donation child must prove the egg
donor owed him or her a duty of care before proving that it was breached in order to have a
negligence case).
268. See generally Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp., 2002 WL 1288784 at *1 (R.I. Super.
2002) (showing that the claim will generally be emotional distress).
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embryos were lost and the donor cannot produce more. There are two cases
on point here. In Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co. 269 stored embryos were
contaminated and rendered unusable. 270 In Frisina v. Women and Infants
Hosp. of R.I, 271 the hospital lost or destroyed stored embryos. 272 The court
denied recovery in Doe because the donors could not establish the requisite
physical injury,273 but the Frisina court allowed recovery based on
emotional distress absent physical trauma.274 While this is, admittedly, a
very small sample of cases, it appears that the majority of jurisdictions
would follow the Doe rationale because most jurisdictions deny recovery
absent physical injury.275 Assuming this is correct, it is unlikely that
defendants will be found liable when stored embryos are lost.
In the second lost embryo scenario a recipient received, and utilized,
materials from someone other than the anticipated donor, resulting in the
birth of a healthy baby. At least one author has been highly critical of the
basis for damages under such circumstances. 276 And, while the suit did not
assert a negligence cause of action, at least one court held that a couple
whose healthy child was conceived using lost embryos was not entitled to
recovery. 277 This decision is not surprising when this lost embryo claim is
juxtaposed with the "wrongful birth" cause of action.
269. 7 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998).
270. Id. at 739.
271. 2002 WL 1288784 (R.I. Super. 2002).
272. Id.at * 1-2.
273. Doe, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
274. 2002 WL 1288784 at *9.
275. See generally Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies: Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice
without Physical Injury, 9 J. MED. & L. 55, 57 (2005) (stating that the lack of a physical injury
seems to leave the victims of fertility malpractice without a compensable injury). However, a
claimant may recover for loss of property in such claims and physical injury would not be
required. See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1273 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) ("While a
party cannot bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based merely on the
negligent destruction of property, a party can recover damages for emotional distress arising from
the tortious loss of property if the emotional distress is unrelated to the pecuniary loss."); Frisna,
2002 WL 1288784 at *10 ("[Tlhe Court finds ... that recovery for damages for emotional distress
based on the 'loss of irreplaceable property,' the loss of their pre-embryos, is permissible").
276. See Liebler, supra note 262, at 15.
277. See Chris Snow, Note, Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center: Fertility
Treatment and the Duty of Care, 2 J.L. FAM. STUD. 63, 67-68 (2000) (addressing the tort of
"negligent infliction of emotional harm" and denying recovery as plaintiffs could not prove the
requisite element of resulting "bodily harm" as part of their injury and damage). But see
Chambliss v. Health Sci. Found., 626 S.E.2d 791, 794 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (awarding $85,000 in
compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages to a woman who was inseminated with
lost materials, although the cause of action and the jury finding regarding bodily injury are unclear
in the appellate opinion).
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Wrongful birth actions are brought by the parents of an impaired child
for the emotional and financial damages they suffer from the birth of that
child.278 At least one author contends that wrongful birth cases have some
judicial support and acceptance. 279 If true, this could increase the likelihood
that damages are awarded in lost embryo cases because, at base, both
wrongful birth and lost materials actions seek damages for birth of a child.
However there are two significant differences in the claims that make it
unlikely that such damages would be awarded in lost embryo cases. First, in
a wrongful birth claim the child is impaired,280 in a lost embryo case the
child is not. Second, the assertion that wrongful birth is judicially
acceptable is true, but far from universal. 281 There are few recorded
wrongful birth decisions, 282 and none since the 1980s.283 Some state courts
refuse to recognize wrongful birth causes of action absent statutory
creation. 284 Some state legislatures have passed laws refusing to recognize
wrongful birth causes of action.285 Only one state, Maine, statutorily
recognizes wrongful birth, and then only for a limited cause of action.286
278. Timothy J. Dawe, Note, Wrongful Life: Time for a "Day in Court", 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,
476(1990).
279. See Megan D. McIntyre, The Potential for Products Liability Actions When Artificial
Insemination by an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 DICK. L. REV.
519, 539-40 (1993).
280. Wrongful Birth damages are predicated on the existence of a congenital defect. See, e.g.,
Hall v. Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 899 A.2d 240, 245, 249 (N.H. 2006).
281. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 160 (2005) (stating that as of 2005, more than half of
all United States jurisdictions recognized wrongful birth).
282. See, e.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (involving a
lawsuit of negligence in that the parents were not warned of pregnancy risks which resulted in the
birth of a deformed child); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (Ida. 1984) (involving a lawsuit
against a physician for negligent failure to diagnose rubella); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987) (involving a case of a child who was born with hemophilia); Berman v.
Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (111. 1979) (involving a lawsuit for wrongful birth when their child was born
congenitally defective); Becker v. Schwartz & Park v. Chessin, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 895 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978) (involving a wrongful life lawsuit alleging the physician failed to inform the
parents of the risks of the pregnancy); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (involving
a case where a child was born physically impaired because his mother contracted rubella); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 372 (Wis. 1975) (involving wrongful life caused by
rubella).
283. The most recent decision we are aware of is Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773 (4th
Cir. 1988).
284. See, e.g., Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1999) (holding that Georgia does not
recognize wrongful birth claims); Campbell v. United States, 962 F.2d 1579 (1Ith Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that Georgia does not recognize wrongful birth claims).
285. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.424(2) (2005) (stating that in Minnesota, "no person shall
maintain a cause of action or receive an award on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of
another, a child would have been aborted.").
286. See ME. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1997) (stating that damages are limited
in the birth of an unhealthy child).
282
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Even where wrongful birth exists, a highly pragmatic consideration exists
when it comes to assessing damage because "[j]uries would have an
extremely difficult time trying to calculate how much the life of a disabled
child is worth." 287
If it is difficult for a jury to calculate damages to parents based on birth
of a disabled child, it is even more difficult to calculate damages to parents
for the birth of a healthy child. Finally, this type of claim seeks damages for
birth and subsequent child rearing expenses. Such damages are seldom
awarded.288 Claimants likely cannot succeed in lost materials cases
because, regardless of which scenario their claim falls under, they cannot
satisfy the requisite elements.289
b. Defective Embryos and Wrongful Life
Defective reproductive materials can cause children born with
defects. 290 The questions addressed in this subsection are whether the
parents, and/or the child, can recover damages for such an existence.
i. Traditional Negligence
The elements of duty and breach raise the same concerns previously
discussed; 29 1 because specific legal duties are largely uncertain, resulting
breach is difficult to prove.
287. See Monique Ann-Marie Croon, Note, Taylor v. Kurapati: The Court of Appeals of
Michigan's Decision of Refusing to Recognize the Tort of Wrongful Birth, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 317, 339 (2002); but see Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr. 120 S.W.3d 682, 689
(Ky. 2003) ("[S]uccessful plaintiffs in wrongful birth actions have received various types of
damages ranging from the expenses resulting from the impairment but not the normal costs of
raising the child, to the entire cost of raising the child with no reduction for the cost of raising a
healthy child, to only the parents' own suffering and mental anguish resulting from the child's birth
but not the expense of raising the child.") That case did not cite other decisions in support of this
contention. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tx. 1975) (asserting that suits seeking
recovery of damages due solely to the existence of life have not been met favorably by courts).
288. See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Hosp., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1376 (Ohio 1989) ("Another
rationale is that the cost of child-rearing would be too speculative to measure with any
certainty.").
289. There is a third possible scenario under this subsection and it combines the two lost
materials scenarios discussed. Material could be lost and delivered to an incorrect recipient, who
then uses it to conceive a child who is impaired. We could not find any record of this occurring,
and we have no sense of how common this scenario might be, but we have to assume it could
happen. If it did occur, it would suffer the same fate as the other lost materials scenarios and for
many of the same reason. First, any legal duty is uncertain. Second, that uncertainty makes
proving breach difficult or impossible. Third, proximate causation may be extremely difficult to
establish because birth defects may be caused by many sources. Finally, it is extremely difficult
for juries to value the harm created by the birth of an impaired child.
290. McIntyre, supra note 279, at 521.
291. See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 638-39 (2003) ("[Clourts may well conclude that
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 14:241
Perhaps more significantly, proximate causation is problematic.
Pursuant to that element, a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, there is a direct causal link between the materials provided and
the resulting condition.292 Such a tie is extremely difficult to establish
because "the majority of genetic and nongenetic birth defects occur as the
result of spontaneous mutations such that causation cannot be attributed to
either biological parent." 293 If the claimant can establish causation,
damages for harm should be much more readily available than in a lost
materials case and should encompass "economic damages of raising [a]
disabled child over and above the ordinary child-bearing expenses." 294
Additionally, depending on the conduct of the defendant, compensatory
damages could provide the basis for punitive damages in defective materials
cases. 295 However, much like lost embryo cases, claimants asserting this
cause of action are unlikely to succeed due to their inability to satisfy the
elements. It does not appear that embryo donors or suppliers currently have
much to fear from this claim.296
c. Wrongful Life Claims
Wrongful Life is a specific claim under the general umbrella of
negligence. It is made by, or on behalf of, an impaired child asserting that
the he or she would have been spared impaired existence, either through
parental choice not to conceive or through an abortion, were it not for the
negligence of a defendant. 297
fertility doctors and clinics have a duty of care running to the class of intended offspring."). This
is a potentially significant development, and a discussion that could shape much regarding this
cause of action, but the author does not propose what that duty is or should be and none of the
cases the he cites in support of this contention involve lost materials. Id.
292. Reich & Swink, supra note 257, at 62.
293. McIntyre, supra note 279, at 537.
294. Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecological Ass'n., 802 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
295. See, e.g., Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (stating that punitive damages may be awarded). However, punitive damage recovery may
not be possible is some jurisdictions, especially if embryo suppliers are treated as some sperm
banks have been. See Kenneth Ofgang, Sperm Bank Protected as "Health Care Provider, " Court
Rules, METROPOLITAN NEWS CO., Sept. 3, 2002, at I ("A sperm bank is a 'health care provider,'
entitled to special statutory protection from punitive damage claims.").
296. It is also possible that the holding facility could assert a "state of the art" defense,
admitting it had a duty to act reasonably and did so, but alleging that medical technology existing
at the time of the donation and transfer was not sufficient to reveal any pre-existing defect in the
reproductive material. See McIntyre, supra note 279, at 544. ("The state-of-the-art defense is
properly invoked only if there was no technologically feasible way of discovering the defect in the
[material]. In these particular cases, the state-of-the-art defense acts as an absolute bar to
negligence.") The viability of this defense then depends on the type of defect and the technology
available at the time of donation and transfer. Id.
297. Dawe, supra note 278, at 475.
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Wrongful life has the same elements previously discussed under
negligence; duty breach, proximate causation and harm. The first three
elements continue to suffer the same deficiencies. The legal duties are
uncertain,298 making breach difficult to prove, 299 and proximate causation
remains difficult to establish. Only three states currently recognize a cause
of action for wrongful life300 and several refused to do so, either by
statute30 1 or common law.302 This lack of acceptance is, at least partially, a
product of the courts' inability to address the legal issue of harm, separate
from a moral or societal issue:
In wrongful life claims.. .the child usually asserts as
"general" damages the pain and suffering he will endure
during his lifetime as a result of the defect, but presumably
less the benefits he will derive from his existence, if any.
This "net burden" is then measured not against the value of
a "normal" life, but against the nullity of nonexistence. 303
The response has been that:
Courts have consistently refused to recognize claims for
wrongful life because of the deep-seated ethical dilemma
298. See Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(holding that a surrogacy business had a special relationship with the parties and, therefore, owed
a duty to protect the resulting child from foreseeable risks).
299. But see Dawes, supra note 278, at 477 ("With few exceptions modem courts have had
little trouble accepting the elements of duty and breach in wrongful life cases."). However, the
author cites only one case in support of this contention. See Albala v. City of New York, 445
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) (holding that the action fails to lie in favor of the child for the injuries
suffered as a result of the preconception tort committed against the mother).
See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (holding that while general damages cannot
be recovered in wrongful life actions, damages for extraordinary expenses can); Procanik ex rel.
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1984) (holding that plaintiffs can recover medical
expenses resulting from wrongful life actions, but not general damages); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (allowing for a wrongful life action).
301. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1
(LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971(2) (West 2010),following Eisbrenner v.
Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kurapati, 600
N.W.2d 670, 691 (Mich. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 188.130(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (2010); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010), following Ellis v. Sherman, 515
A.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Pa. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-3-109 (2008).
302. See Ronen Perry, It's a Wonderful Life, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 336-37 (2008) (listing
more than 20 states where courts rejected such claims). See also Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA), Inc.,
2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 581, at *8-*12 (rejecting a tort claim brought on behalf of a child born
with cystic fibrosis against a fertility clinic for negligence in genetic screening of IVF embryos
before implantation because it amounted to a claim for Wrongful Life not recognized in
Massachusetts).
303. Dawe, supra note 278, at 479-80.
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involved.304 Few courts have been willing to say that
children, no matter how severely impaired, would have
better off had they never been born. "One of the most
deeply held beliefs in our society is that life-whether
experienced with or without major physical handicap-is
more precious than non-life." 305
Courts have held ". . .that life itself cannot constitute injury." 30 6 As a
result the harm element cannot be satisfied when there is a birth, even the
birth of an impaired child. In the unlikely event that a wrongful life cause of
action is recognized, a claimant will find it very difficult to establish any of
the first three elements, and the fourth may be judicially impossible for the
parent(s) 307 or the child.301
4. Embryo Disposal - the Liability Mystery
We discussed specific causes of action that may make embryo donors
or suppliers liable above, but we would be remiss if we did not also address
potential liability for embryo storage facilities intentionally destroying
embryos. The challenge is that we cannot identify one primary cause of
action likely at issue because liability would depend on the legal status of
embryos. What we do believe is that there are more than 500,000 embryos
currently in cryopreservation. 309  Those embryos belong310  to the
304. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 ("[W]hether it is better never to have
been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to
be left to the philosophers and the theologians.").
305. See McIntyre, supra note 279, at 539 (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J.
1979)).
306. Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REV.
327, 328 (2004).
307. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967) ("A considerable problem
is raised by the claim of injury to the parents. In order to determine their compensatory damages a
court would have to evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex
human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged emotional and
money injuries. Such a proposed weighing is similar to that which we have found impossible to
perform for the infant plaintiff. When the parents say their child should not have been born, they
make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being the mother and father of a
defective child. Though we sympathize with the unfortunate situation in which these parents find
themselves, we firmly believe the right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their
right not to endure emotional and financial injury.").
308. Id. at 692 ("The infant would have us measure the difference between his life with defects
against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such determination.").
309. See Mundy, supra note 48 (estimating that there are approximately a half of a million
embryos in storage).
310. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 2008) (describing that the fertilized ovum is not
the property of the doctor who conducted the fertilization or the facility, but rather the property of
the invitro fertilization patient or other guardian appointed if the invitro fertilization patient cannot
be located).
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prospective parents, at least until certain contractual events do or do not
occur311 and many of those prospective parents eventually place the holding
facility in a position where it has the legal right to dispose of the
embryos. 312 While many of these facilities would like to do so,313 they are
very afraid of litigation. 314 They might gain guidance from a very small
pool of decisions holding that embryo disposition is usually dictated by
contract. 315 However, not all courts hold such agreements enforceable and
311. See Fontini Antonia Skouvakis, Comment, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests
Approach to Decide the Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 885, 902 (2005) (stating that the author spoke to twenty infertility clinics posing as a
potential customer with all of the clinics claiming they utilized "informed consent" forms
identifying how pre-embryos would be disposed of). But see Mundy, supra note 48 (nothing that
doctors, while commonly contractually empowered to dispose of embryos in events such as
patient divorce, disappearance, or failure to make payment, do not dispose out of fear of unknown
litigation).
Interestingly such agreements may restrict the recipient's disposition options as well. See id. For
an interesting hypothetical scenario, see Jonathan Penn, Note, A Different Kind of Life Estate: The
Laws, Rights, and Liabilities Associated with Donated Embryos, 21 REGENT U.L. REV. 207, 208
(2008-2009) (stating that the scenario involves a contract specifying that "notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Intended Parents.. shall not donate, see, or otherwise transfer any donated ova, pre-
embryos, or embryos that result from the Procedure to another person or couple (other than a
gestational surrogate working with the Intended Parents) for the purpose of conception").
312. See Mundy, supra note 48 ("The way this happens is: When patients agree to have
embryos frozen, they sign forms stating what should be done with the embryos should the patients
divorce, disappear, or stop paying storage fees. After treatment has concluded, many patients
eventually do stop paying, disappear, move [and] leave no forwarding address."). Many embryo
owners cannot be located, period. Id.
313. See id. ("People do not want to inherit embryos."). This article further states:
And the risk of holding them is considerable. "I have tons of embryos, and I
can't track down the owners," said one Los Angeles doctor, Vicken Sahakian
of the Pacific Fertility Center... "It's one of the main problems I have. I have
thousands of embryos from patients who have been through this program for,
what, 10-, 12-plus years, changing addresses, and never called back, never
paid storage fees-you can't track them down... His "biggest nightmare," he
said, is that he will be unable to sell his practice when he is ready to retire,
because no doctor will want to buy a practice that comes with a closetful of
unclaimed embryos and the vague, terrible responsibility they entail. "The
person buying it does not want to buy the embryos. That's the rule," he said.
"People do not want to inherit embryos. So what do you do with them? I
have embryos that have been here since 1992."
Id.
314. See id. ('Nobody does it [destroys abandoned embryos],' says Alan DeCherney, the
editor of Ferility and Sterility and a reproductive endocrinologist who is now at the National
Institute of Health. 'It's a hot topic. People think the risk of holding them is less than the risk of
destroying them."').
315. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (New York 1984) (contract indicates the
disposition of pre-zygote embryos); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263-64 (Wash. 2002)
(holding the contract signed between intended parents was intended to apply to both parents
together and not intended separately and awarded embryos to parent not wishing to use them);
York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 424, 427 (E.D. Va. 1989) (describing the pre-zygote embryo
contract provisions).
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almost all of the existing cases arose out of disputes that addressed some
aspect of potentially unwanted familial relationships. 316 Only one case is
possibly on point in terms of the independent disposition by a holding
facility with no inter-related "custody" issues, New York-Del Zio v.
Presbyterian Hospital.317
In New York-Del Zio, the Del Zios underwent in vitro fertilization
using Mr. Del Zio's sperm and Mrs. Del Zio's egg. 318 The co-mingled
materials were placed in an incubator.319 A supervisor learned of the
embryo, felt it was his ethical duty to destroy it, consulted hospital officials,
and did destroy it. 320 The Del Zios brought suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and wrongful conversion. 32 1 The jury returned a verdict
for the Del Zios on the intentional infliction claim, but for the hospital on
the wrongful conversion cause of action.322 We glean two things from New
York-Del Zio. First, a holding facility disposing of an embryo, without
contractual right, can be liable to the prospective parents in tort. Second, if
the embryo is viewed as other than property, the facility is not liable under
wrongful conversion, as conversion is predicated on wrongful possession of
property. 323 This is extremely interesting because, if embryos are not
property, some disposal would open the door for wrongful death 324 claims,
but one court found that it unlikely a defendant could be held responsible
316. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Iowa 2003) (arguing that it
is against public policy to enforce contracts regarding reproductive choice); A.Z v. B.Z, 725
N.E.2d 1051, 1058-59 (Mass. 2000) (declining to impose on parents whether or not to have a
child); J.B. v. M.B, 751 A.2d 613, 619-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (refusing to bind
people to familial relationships).
317. 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450, at *16 (noting that the jury could have found the
defendant's guilty under the conversion claim).
318. Id. at *2.
319. Id. at *2-*3.
320. Id. at *3.
321. Id. at *1.
322. Id. at *11.
323. See Penn, supra note 311, at 213 (Presumably, the jury in the Del Zio case found for the
Del Zios on the emotional distress claim because they viewed the embryo as the only opportunity
for the Del Zios to become pregnant and hopefully give birth to a child. Viewing the embryo as
the potential for human life is also consistent with the jury's finding for the defendants on the
wrongful conversion claim, a claim where it must be proven that "one who, without authority,
intentionally exercised control over the property of another and thereby interfered with the other's
right of possession . . . ." Presumably, the jury considered the embryo to be human life or the
potential for human life, rather than property. Therefore, the jury denied the Del Zios' property
claim of wrongful conversion.").
324. For purposes of this article "wrongful death" is defined as "[t]he taking of the life of an
individual resulting from the willful or negligent act of another person or persons." WEST'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, available at http://www.answers.com/topic/wrongful-death-
claim (last visited Mar. 11, 2011); See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1752 (9th ed.
2009)(defining wrongful death action as "[a] lawsuit brought on behalf of a decedent's survivors
for their damages resulting from a tortious injury that caused the decent's death).
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for the wrongful death of a human embryo because the claim would be too
speculative, 325 while another found that the state Wrongful Death Act was
not applicable to situations where the embryo was destroyed pre-
implantation. 326 On the other hand, if embryos are property, it seems only
logical that facilities disposing of them, in violation of an existing contract,
could face liability from conversion 327 claims, and possibly other causes of
action such as trespass to chattels328
B. The Surrogacy Trade329
"In the absence ofstatutory law positively governing our decision,
we must innovate. "330
1. Negligence
The well-established elements of negligence are duty, breach,
proximate causation, and damage or injury.331 As we discuss next, in a
surrogacy arrangement the surrogate providers, and the surrogate herself,
may face negligence liability. The surrogate provider may be liable for
325. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1270 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
326. See Miller v. American Infertility Group, 897 N.E.2d 837, 844-45 (2008)(finding that the
Wrongful Death Act had never been applied to in vitro fertilization situations or the
cryopreservation of embryos and thus cannot be applied to situations resulting from the embryo
destruction because of in virto fertilization). The case, in dicta, left open the issue of applicability
post-implantation. Id at 846.
327. While the specific elements of torts vary by jurisdiction, a common definition of
"conversion" is "[t]he unlawful turning or applying the personal goods of another to the use of the
taker, or of some other person than the owner; or the unlawful destroying or altering their nature."
Legal Definition of Conversion, THE LECTRIC LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c309.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011); See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 381 (9th ed. 2009) (defining conversion as "[tihe act of changing from one form to
another; the process of being exchanged).
328. See Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary
Perspectives, 42 UCLA L. REV. 445, 522-23 n. 307 (1994) ("The early common law
distinguished between trespass to chattel, a lesser form of conversion involving negligent
interference with the property of others, and conversion, an intentional exercise of dominion or
control which seriously interferes with the right of another to control the property."). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217 cmt. b, 222 cmt. a & 222(A) (1965).
329. While discussion of the employment relationship between surrogates and surrogate
providers is beyond the scope of this article, we do note that potential provider liability for
surrogate actions or inaction could differ depending on whether surrogates are employed as
employees or independent contractors. See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma:
Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV.
1219, 1237 (1996-1997) (noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior depends on existence of
employer-employee, or closely analogous, relationship and generally does not apply to acts of
independent contractor).
330. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1992).
331. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., 120 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Ky. 2003).
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failing to screen materials used or the prospective parties. The surrogate
may be liable for care taken of the embryo while in her possession, as the
relationship between her and the prospective parent(s) may be a bailment.
a. Screening
Tissues potentially involved in surrogacy include sperm, eggs, and
embryos. While there are no cases on point regarding eggs and embryos,
there is a sperm case that may provide insight regarding potential surrogate
provider liability.332 Stiver v. Parker33 3 addressed the situation where the
surrogate (Stiver) was artificially inseminated with the untested sperm of
the prospective father (Malahoff).334 The resulting child suffered from
cytomegalic inclusion disease ("CID"), transmitted through his father's
sperm.335 The child's CID symptoms included hearing loss, mental
retardation, and severe neuro-muscular disorders. 336 The surrogate, and her
husband, brought suit under a negligence claim against the clinic. 337 The
trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the broker in a
surrogacy arrangement had no legal duty.338 The court of appeals
reversed339 holding:
We conclude that... the surrogacy business designer and
broker and other defendant professionals who profited from
the program, owed affirmative duties to the Stivers and to
Malahoff, the surrogacy program beneficiaries. This duty,
an affirmative duty of protection, marked by heightened
diligence, arises out of a special relationship because the
defendants engaged in the surrogacy business and expected
to profit thereby. 340  Our view is that surrogate
arrangements for the transfer of babies present significant
dangers for society and therefore require careful regulation
and control through the development of the common law of
332. The analogy is appropriate as sperm and embryos are both reproductive tissues. See supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
333. 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1993).
334. Id. at 263.
335. Id.
336. Id. Interestingly, it was later learned that the surrogate was already pregnant when
inseminated. Id. The father of the resulting child was, in fact, the surrogate's husband and not the
clinic's client. Id..
337. Id. at 264.
338. Id.
339. See id. ("We conclude under the Michigan law of negligence that the defendants owed an
affirmative duty to act to protect the plaintiffs against harm, a duty that may have been
breached.").
340. Id. at 268.
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negligence. . . [t]his strong state interest justifies
regulation. . . in new areas of "baby transfer" made possible
by technology. 341
While Stiver was not mandatory authority, a later case adopted its
"special relationship" basis for establishing a legal duty in surrogacy
arrangements. In Huddleston v. Infertility Center ofAmerica342 the child of
a traditional surrogate died after suffering serious abuse by his father.343
The surrogate (Huddleston) brought a variety of claims, including
negligence, against the infertility clinic contracting her services. 344 The
court first distilled the issue; "Is there a duty owed by a surrogacy clinic to
the participants of a program which is specifically designed to create a child
outside the boundaries of the traditional nuclear family setting?" 345 It then
concluded, much like Stiver, that:
[A] business operating for the sole purpose of
organizing and supervising the very delicate process of
creating a child, which reaps handsome profits from such
endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable
risks of the surrogacy undertaking because a "special
relationship" exists between the surrogacy business, its
client-participants, and, most especially, the child which the
surrogacy undertaking creates. Such a special relationship
existed between ICA, Appellant and Jonathan in this case
and thus, ICA owed them an affirmative duty of
protection.346
That "protection" meant that the surrogate provider had the duty to
screen prospective parents. It is also clear from the court's discussion that
providers had the duty to screen prospective surrogates as well.347 The
above cases identify duties that could be breached and provide facts that
could allow proximate causation determination. However the damage
element may again be difficult to meet in jurisdictions requiring physical
injury.348 If embryos are "people", there could be requisite physical
341. Id. at 269.
342. 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
343. Id. at 455-56.
344. Id. at 456.
345. Id. at 457.
346. Id. at 460.
347. See id. (failing to reach a conclusion on that issue but noting that other jurisdictions
required parties to prospective surrogacy agreements to undergo psychological testing); Mercer,
supra note 29, at 80 ("Since there may be potential liability to clinics and agencies involved with
embryo transfer... it would be in the clinic or agency's best interest to perform background checks
on recipient couples in order to reduce potential liability.").
348. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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injury.3 49 If, on the other hand, embryos are property, liability assessment
may be assessed under the traditional concept of "bailment."
2. Bailment
A bailment is "[a] delivery of personal property by one person (the
bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds the property for a certain
purpose,... [usually] under an express or implied-in fact contract."350
There are three types of bailments: (1) for mutual benefit to the bailor and
bailee; (2) for the sole benefit of the bailor; and (3) for the sole benefit of
the bailee. 351 When embryos are property, surrogacy is legally a mutual
bailment. In a mutual bailment the bailee must take reasonable care of the
bailed property.352 A bailee who fails to do so may be held liable for any
damages incurred from his or her negligence. 353 While the contention that
surrogacy is a bailment will be unconscionable to those against
commodification of human reproductive tissue,354 at least one court has
applied bailment law when deciding ownership rights of an embryo. 355 That
court was correct. Bailment provides the proper liability analysis where
embryos do not have some sort of heightened legal status because, in those
jurisdictions, embryos are property.
349. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 500, 503 (N.J. 1960) (noting that some
jurisdictions also recognize prenatal torts without specifically finding that an unborn child is a
"person in being").
350. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 163 (9th ed. 2009).
351. RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 53:3 (4th ed. 2001).
352. Id. at § 53:5.
353. Id.
354. See supra note 222. One author believes this discussion is much less heated than in the
past. See Elizabeth Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 121 (2009) ("Today the issue is seldom framed as baby selling and exploitation;
instead the discourse emphasizes the service provided by surrogates to couples who otherwise
could not have genetically related children."). However, it is difficult to imagine a dearth of
heated opinions should a surrogate seek to exercise a "lien" over a resulting child in order to
enforce payment and it appears some surrogacy agreements anticipate just such situation. See
Indian Surrogacy Law Centre, Surrogacy Agreement, http://indiansurrogacylaw.com/surrogacy-
agreement.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (listing "[c]hild no lien for dispute over the
compensation" under a "checklist for every surrogacy agreement"). While seeking to enforce such
a lien would, undoubtedly, create an emotional fervor, the legal issue is clearly addressed under
the 13' Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States. ). No such lien
would be enforceable. Id.
355. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (explaining that a
"Cryopreservation Agreement created a bailor-bailee relationship between the plaintiffs and
defendants").
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3. Breach of Contract
This potential cause of action may correlate with aspects of negligence
assessment. The first element of negligence is duty. The existence of that
element is well established, but its definition is always subjective as it is
predicated upon the "reasonable person" standard. 356 Clarification of a
surrogate's duties may come from a surrogacy contract.357 Breach of any
such duty would then not only satisfy the first two elements of negligence,
but also trigger breach of contract. Surrogates should face liability when
failing to do what that agreement requires, 358 while surrogate providers
should face liability when failing to meet contractual duties to surrogates or
prospective parents.359 This cause of action is viable, but determination of
controlling law may be difficult 360 and breach of contract may be
impossible in jurisdiction invalidating any form of surrogacy agreement.
VII. LOOKING AHEAD
The increasingly symbiotic relationship between ART and the Internet
fundamentally changes how human procreation can be facilitated. Much is
uncertain in the Cyberprocreation Era, but issues regarding embryo
donation and/or surrogacy will be significant on many levels, and likely
manifest quickly. Accordingly we offer the following predictions and
recommendations:
1. Prediction - a group, or groups, will call for an absolute ban on
embryo donation and/or commercial surrogacy worldwide.
356. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 810 (2004) ("Duty in negligence actions is substantially
defined by foreseeability of risk as measured by the reasonably prudent person.").
357. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 272 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Clark v. Dalman, 150
N.W.2d 755, 760 (1967)) ("Although affirmative duties in negligence law are imposed 'by
operation of law,' a contract frequently operates in the background and the specific obligations
'may and frequently do[] arise out of a contractual relationship.').
358. Agreements may require the to-be surrogate promise to refrain from activities such as
smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol, or taking other drugs. Golnar Modjtahedi, Nobody's Child:
Enforcing Surrogacy Contracts, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 243, 249 (1998); see also INFORMATION
ON SURROGACY, Common Sense Clauses for the Best Surrogacy, http://www.information-on-
surrogacy.com/best-surrogacy.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2011) (suggesting that drafters include
anti-smoking and drinking clauses in surrogacy contracts).
359. See supra notes 222-42 and accompanying text (discussing contractual liability in
surrogacy agreements under the UCC).
360. See Baiman, supra note 121, at 135 ("[l]s the applicable state law the law of the home
state of the genetic parents, the law of the state in which the embryos were created, or the law of
the state where the recipient party lives?"). One could go further and add the law of the state
where the embryos are currently located and the law of the state where the contract was created to
this list.
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Recommendation - it is unlikely that such restriction would be
adopted globally due to political volatility361 and economic necessity. 362
Such a ban would really create fewer good and service providers, likely
with even less regulation. 363 We do not recommend this ban.
2. Prediction - there will be a call for the United States to ban embryo
donation 364 and/or commercial surrogacy.
Recommendation - we cannot endorse this proposal, as it would likely
result in fewer providers with less regulation. We do recommend that
Congress use its interstate commerce power to regulate collection, storage,
and screening of human embryos. 365 While some authors favor "double
decker" ART regulation, meaning directives at both the federal and state
levels, 366 we recommend any other embryo, and all surrogacy regulation,
only at the state level, 367 We do so for two reasons. First, state courts
decide family law issues. 368 Second, as detailed in the case law369 and
361. See Morris, supra note 94, at 704-05 (discussing Italy's extreme shift from one of the
least ART regulated countries to one that now prohibits egg donorship for ART). The article also
stated that "[t]his problem will only be inflamed as countries continue to change their laws, which
are becoming increasingly divergent from one another." Id. at 708.
362. Market demands may sway countries to defy international agreements in pursuit of RT
dollars. See Id. at 707-08. Additionally, clinics are sourcing reproductive materials from poorer
countries. See Buying Babies, Bit By Bit; Assisted Conception, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006 at
117-118.
363. See Cortez, supra note 81, at 104 ("As medical tourism becomes more lucrative, countries
may compete by offering treatments that other countries do not offer. Poor countries may be
tempted to offer treatments that are illegal or highly experimental elsewhere.").
364. See, e.g., Ann Bindu Thomas, Avoiding Embryos "R" Us: Toward A Regulated Fertility
Industry, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 247, 271 (2008) (advocating for three components of such
regulation: "(1) embryos should not be bought or sold in a monetary exchange, (2) donors'
decisions should be fully informed and truly voluntary, and (3) embryo procurement organizations
should be non-profit and conform to standards similar to [the National Organ Transplant Act]").
365. But see Debra Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 531, 533 (2005) ("Americans, with their distrust of bureaucratic authority, would never
condone the extension of federal power into the intimate affairs of reproduction."); Alicia
Ouellette et al., Lessons From Across the Pond Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United
Kingdom and the United States, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 419, 433 (2005) (arguing that federal
regulation of ART is problematic). These perspectives may or may not be prescient, but the sale of
some body parts is already federally regulated. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006) ("It shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.").
366. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children ofART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the
Law Protect then from Harm?, 207 PLI/CRIM 325, 328 (2004); Wise, supra note 36, at 188-189.
367. This would also be in accord with the most current version of the UPA. See UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 109, at § 802 cmt. (2002) ("[T]he core sections of this article
provide for state involvement, through judicial oversight, of the gestational agreement before,
during, and after the assisted reproductive processes.").
368. See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive
Social Issue, 100 N.W. U. L. REv. 465, 466 (2006) ("[D]omestic relations law is generally
reserved for the states."). However, the author goes on to recognize, with regard to ART issues, "a
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demonstrated statutorily, 370 the states may have very different public
policies regarding embryos and surrogacy. 371 We understand this
recommendation will create a lack of uniformity, 372 and that some will
attempt to exploit lax or nonexistent state laws, 373 but it appropriately
respects the divergent interests of the individual states.
3. Prediction - there will be an increasing market for designer
embryos, likely a significant one, despite inevitable controversy. This
market will be fueled by customers seeking a cheaper and more effective
alternative to IVF and fed by suppliers providing embryos created outside
the human body.374 Individual suppliers will attempt to stand out in that
market by implying, but not outright promising, that resulting children will
have, or not have, certain characteristics.
Recommendation - we cannot speak to the non-domestic markets as
there is too much uncertain or unknown in terms of policy or priority, but
United States embryo suppliers, supplying to American clients, should pay
close attention to what has happened and what that portends for the future.
The technological advances that may make market participation attractive
will also present increasing liability under causes of action for strict product
liability and breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. While
fractured, state-by-state approach to the subject has arisen." Id. Another author would likely
contend those differences are acceptable, and the key is that parties considering surrogacy
arrangements have clear statutory directive so that they can make informed decision. See Baiman,
supra note 121, at 135 ("Without a clear statutory scope, parties and courts will remain in the dark
as to which state law applies in a dispute.").
369. See supra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 130-62 and accompanying text.
371. It seems a safe assumption that this is one of the reasons so few states adopted UPA 2002
and none without changes. See supra notes 139-62 and accompanying text. There was another
uniform law proposed as well. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT
(1988). http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.htm. We find no record of
any state adopting this Act.
372. See Hugh McLachlan and J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the
Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 92 (2009) ("In federations like the United States or the European Union,
the unevenness of legal restriction or regulation by individual states or countries compounds the
problem."); but see Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[E]ven
though [that] might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, [it] would bring some predictability to
those who seek to make use of artificial reproductive techniques.").
373. In fact, that is precisely what attorney Noel Keane did. Frustrated that his home state of
Michigan treated compensation to surrogates as illegal, he sent couples to Kentucky where there
was no such restriction. See Spivak, supra note 154, at 98. Keane would become known as the
"father of surrogate motherhood." Id.
374. It is unlikely that prospective parents will be able to find true embryo donors. At least one
study demonstrates that parents of preserved embryos cannot make a donation or "disposition
decision". See Mundy, supra note 48, at 5. "The average embryo had been in storage for four
years. Even after that much time had elapsed, 72 % had not decided what to do, and a number
echoed the words of one patient: 'We can't talk about it."' Id.
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these are "unheard of' now, they likely will become quite strident in the not
too distant future.
4. Prediction - states will struggle with the legal status of embryos and
this will impact disposal of stored embryos and potential surrogate liability.
Recommendation - states not concluding that embryos have some
"additional" rights, or otherwise regulating surrogacy arrangements, should
apply bailment analysis as embryos are property. States statutorily defining
embryos as "people" must address disposal and surrogate liability under
wrongful death causes of action. States that have elevated embryo status,
either at common law or by statute, should follow a case-by-case analysis
similar to Davis v. Davis,375 with the understanding that a) Davis was
decided on different grounds; 376 b) at a point in time before dramatic ART
use growth commenced; 377 and c) these are potentially highly volatile
issues.378 States that have fetal homicide statutes, or otherwise at least
tacitly treat embryos as more than property, should adopt case-by-case
analysis as well.
5. Prediction - prospective parties will continue to develop and rely on
surrogacy contracts.
Recommendation - would-be parties must be aware of the laws and
public policies of the jurisdictions that may interpret their agreements. 379 if
375. 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
376. Id. ("Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than the use of the
[embryos] in question.").
377. So, potentially, there could be a lot of case-by-case analysis going forward. This may
prove unwieldy to courts seeking efficiency and clear precedent.
378. See supra note 222. On a related note, these are exactly the types of legal issues, ones
with potentially polarizing moral underpinnings, that could be potentially problematic for judges,
particularly elected judges engaging in case-by-case analysis. For example, all three Iowa
Supreme Court Justices failed to withstand retention vote after the Court unanimously upheld a
pro-gay marriage ruling in the prior term. It was the first time any Justice had been removed since
1962. Adam Cohen, Iowa Vote Shows the Injustice of Electing Judges, TIME, Nov. 10, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2030526,00.html. This type of movement may
just be getting started and elected Judges may lose office due to "unpopular" decisions. See
Michael J. Crumb & Nomaan Merchant, Ouster of Iowa Judges May Inspire Activists Rights
Groups, Legal Experts Fear Loss of Impartial, Free Judiciary, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2010, at
A32 (discussing further potential activism in this area).
379. In one instance, a New York male contracted with a Minnesota female for surrogacy
services. P.G.M. v. J.M.A., 2007 Min. App. LEXIS 1189, *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). The couple
executed a written gestational surrogacy agreement "(GSA") that specified the agreement was
governed by Illinois law. Id at *3. The IVF and implantation procedures took place at an Illinois
clinic. Id. at *4-*5. The Minnesota court applied Illinois law. Id. at *6. While this holding is
straight-forward, this case should not be read too broadly. The court reasoned that "Minnesota
courts 'traditionally enforce[] parties' contractual law provisions."' Id. at *7. However, the court
also noted that "Minnesota courts will not enforce an otherwise validly executed contract that
contravenes public policy. Contracts violate public policy when they injure some established
societal interest." Id. at *15 (citations omitted). The decision came down to the fact that there was
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not, they may be unpleasantly surprised to learn that a) the contract is not
enforceable; b) the surrogate may have parental rights; c) the surrogate may
have parental responsibilities; and even d) parties may face criminal charges
for pursuing services abroad that are illegal domestically.380 This multitude
of uncertainties epitomizes the plight of embryo donors and suppliers,
surrogates and surrogate providers, and prospective parents in the
Cyberprocreation era. Ongoing discussion and analysis is vital because, in
terms of human reproduction, the Internet generates more questions than
answers.
no established public policy in Minnesota prohibiting GSAs or the enforcement of GSAs. See id.
at *16. ("[T]here is no Minnesota statute or caselaw that prohibits GSAs."). This holding can
certainly be read to mean that the contract would not have been enforced, despite the selection of
Illinois law, if the result would have violated Minnesota public policy. This is important to note as
there are certainly states where a GSA would violate such policy. Similar uncertainty may even
exist within a state. Compare Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320, 327 (Mass. 2004) (upholding a
choice of law provision in a surrogacy agreement) with R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass.
1998) (refusing to uphold a choice of law provision in a surrogacy agreement).
380. See Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy (Nov.
5, 2007), http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-to-california-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-
surrogacy/ (discussing a French couple who flew to California to use the services of an American
commercial surrogate because such services are illegal in France but returned home - with twin
girls - to find multiple criminal charges for their actions; the counts were dismissed, but only on
pleading technicalities, and not for lack of merit).
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